UNINED STATES vs. WILLIAMSON.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

.DistrictCourt, United States, Eastern -Districtof _Pennsylvania.
UNITED STATES eX 2e-lat. WHEELER VS. PASSMORE WILLIAMSON.
1. The doctrines laid down in this case as reported in 3 Am. Law Register, 729,
re-affirmed.
2. Where a habeas corpus is issued by a master on behalf of slaves, alleged to have
been carried away by force from him, and the defendant is committed for a contempt in not making a proper return to the writ, the court will not entertain a
motion to quash the proceedings upon the petition and suggestion of one of the
negroes that she is and was absenting herself from her master voluntarily, and
that she is not nor ever was in the custody, possession, power or control of the
defendant; such slave not coming or being brought personally within the jurisdiction or before the court, in order to make the application.

After the proceedings in this case as reported ante, vol. iii. p. 729,
no further steps were taken in this court on the part of the defendant, until Wednesday, October 3, 1855, when Mr. Townsend and
Mr. John M. Read, presented to the court a paper purporting to be
"the suggestion and petition of Jane Johnson ;" on which they
moved for a rule to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus,
issued against Passmore Williamson, should not be quashed.
The paper in question was in the following form:
To the Honorable John K. Kane, Judge of the aforesaid court:

The suggestion and petition of Jane Johnson, respectfully show eth:
That she is one of the three parties named in the aforesaid writ
of habeas corpus, and the mother of the two children, Daniel and
Isaiah, also named therein, and thereby required to be produced.
That before the occurrences hereinafter stated, this petitioner and
her said two children lived in Washington, in the District of Columbia, and were claimed and held by the said John I. Wheeler as
his slaves, according to the laws and usages of that District. That
on the 18th day of July, 1855, the said John H. Wheeler, voluntarily brought your petitioner and her two children fro'm the city
of Washington to the city of Philadelphia, passing through Bal-
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timore, and reaching Philadelphia by way of the Philadelphia,
Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad. Mr. Wheeler stopped at
Bloodgood's Hotel, in Philadelphia, at the foot of Walnut street,
and fronting on the Delaware river, and remained there with your
petitioner and her said two children, from about 2 o'clock, P. I.,
until shortly before 5 o'clock, P. L., when he directed your petitioner to bring her children and accompany him on board a steamboat belonging to the railroad line to New York, which boat was
then being attached to the pier in front of the said hotel; which direction was complied with, and your petitioner seated herself with
her said two children, on the upper deck of the said boat, near Mr.
Wheeler. Your petitioner was very desirous of procuring the freedom of herself and her children, and before she left Washington
determined to make an effort to do so, if said Wheeler should take
her north. While stopping at the hotel as aforesaid, Mr. Wheeler
went to dinner ; and while your petitioner was absent from his presence, she informed one of the waiters at the said hotel (a colored
woman,) that she and her children were slaves. A few minutes before 5 o'clock, while said Wheeler, your petitioner, and
her children were on the upper deck of the steamboat as aforesaid,
a white gentleman, whose name your petitioner has since been informed is Passmore Williamson, approached your petitioner, and
informed her that she was free if she chose to claim her liberty,
and asked her if she desired to be free. Your petitioner replied
that she did wish to be free, as in truth and in fact she did; and
said Williamson then further informed your petitioner that if she
wished her liberty, she could go ashore and take her children with
her, and that no one had a right to prevent her doing so ; but that
she must decide promptly whether she would go or stay, as the boat
would soon start. Your petitioner being desirous to go on shore,
rose to go, and was taken hold of by said Wheeler, who urged her
to stay with him ; but your petitioner refused to stay, and voluntarily
and most willingly left the boat, aided in the departure by several
colored persons, who took her children with her consent, and led or
carried them off the boat, and conducted your petitioner and her
said children to a carriage a short distance from the boat, which
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carriage they entered, and went away. Mr. Williamson did not
accompany the colored persons who were assisting your petitioner to
get away, but remained some distance behind ; and your petitioner
has never seen him since she left the steamboat as aforesaid.
Your petitioner further states, that she was not at the time of her
leaving Mr. Wheeler as aforesaid, or at any time since, in any way or
manner whatever in the custody, power, possession or control of
Mr. Williamson, nor has she received from him any directions or
instructions, directly or indirectly whither she should go. But
claiming and believing that she and her children are free, your petitioner has ever since her leaving said Wheeler, exercised her right,
as a free woman, to go whither she pleased, and to take her said
children, and has not since that time been restrained of her liberty
by any person whatever.
Your petitioner is advised, and respectfully submits to your honor,
that the said writ of habeas corpus ought to be quashed under the
facts above stated, and for the following, among other reasons: First,
The said Wheeler had no control over or right to the possession of
your petitioner or her said children at the issuing of the aforesaid
writ, they being then free. Second, Because the said writ was
issued without the knowledge or consent of your petitioner, and
against her wish: Third, Because in truth and in fact, at the
issuing of the said writ and at all times since your petitioner left the
company of said Wheeler as aforesaid, neither she nor her said
children have been detained or restrained of their liberty by said Williamson or any other person whatever. Fourth, Because under the
writ of habeas corpus, which is a writ devised and intended to restore freemen to liberty when unluly restrained thereof, the said
John H. Wheeler seeks to reclaim and recover your petitioner and
her said children, and reduce them again into slavery.
Wherefore, your petitioner respectfully prays this honorable cburt,
that the said writ of habeas corpus and all proceedings under it,
may be quashed, and especially that the said Passmore Williamson may be discharged from his imprisonment.
her

JANE x JOHNSON.
mark.
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United States of America, District of lfassachusetts:
On this twenty-sixth day of September, A. D. 1855, the abovenamed
Jane Johnson, personally appearing, made solemn oath that the facts
-stated in the foregoing petition, so far as they are written of her
own knowledge, are true, and all other facts therein stated, she
believes to be true. Before me,

C. W. LORING,
C'om. U. S. Court Dist. Massachusetts.
Upon the motion being made, Judge Kane expressed a doubt
whether he could properly entertain it, inasmuch as it did not appear
that Jane Johnson had a status in the court. This question was
then partially argued by Mr. Read; and on the Monday and Tuesday following, it was discussed very fully by both the counsel.
On Friday, October 12th, Judge Kane delivered his opinion as
follows:KAi-P, J.-Before entering upon the question immediately before me at this time, it is proper that I should advert to the past
action of this court in the case of Passmore Williamson, and to the
considerations that led to it. I do this the rather, because in some
of the judicial reviews to which it has been submitted collaterally,
after an ex parte argument, it does not seem to me to have been
fully apprehended.
I begin with the writ which originated the proceeding.
The writ of habeas corpus is of immemorial antiquity. It is
deduced by the standard writers on the English law from the great
charter of King John. It is unquestionable, however, that it is
substantially of much earlier date.; and it may be referred without
improbability, to the period of the Roman invasion. Like the trial
by jury, it entered into the institutions of Rome before the Christian
era, if not as early as the times of the republic. Through the long
series of political struggles which gave form to the British Constitution, it was claimed as the birthright of every Englishman, and
our ancest6rs brought it with them as such to this country.
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At the common law, it issued whenever a citizen was denied the
exercise of his personal liberty, or was deprived of his rightful
control over any member of his household, his wife, his child, his
ward, or his servant. It issued from the courts of the sovereign,
and in his name, at the instance of any one who invoked it, either
for himself or another. It commanded, almost in the words of the
Roman edict,' that the party under detention should be produced
before the court, there to await its decree. It left no discretion
with the party to whom it was addressed. He was not to constitute
himself the judge of his own rights or of his own conduct; but to
bring in the body, and to declare the cause wherefore he had
detained it; and the judge was then to determine whether that
cause was sufficient in law or not. Such in America, as well as
England, was the well known, universally recognized writ of habeas
corpus.
When the Federal Convention was engaged in framing a constitution for the United States, a proposition was submitted to it by
one of the members, that "the privileges and benefits of the writ
of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this.government in the most
expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the
'
legislature except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions. 2
The committee to whom this was referred for consideration, would
seem to have regarded the privilege in question as too definitely
implied in the idea of free government to need formal assertion or
confirmation ; for they struck out that part of the proposed article
in which it was affirmed, and retained only so much as excluded
the question of its suspension from the ordinary range of congressional legislation.
The convention itself must have concurred in their views ; for in
the Constitution, as digested, and finally ratified, and as it stands
now, there is neither enactment nor recognition of the privilege of
this writ, except as it is implied in the provision that it shall not be
suspended. It stands then under the Constitution of the United

1 ,,Do libero homine

exhibendo" D. 43. T. 29.
a Seethe Madison papers, Vol. III. p. 1365.
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States, as it was under the common law of English America, an
indefeasible privilege, above the sphere of ordinary legislation.,
I do not think it necessary to argue from the words of this article, that the Congress was denied the power of limiting or restrict- ing or qualifying the right, which it was thus forbidden to suspend. I do not, indeed, see that there can be a restriction or limitation of a privilege which may not be essentially a suspension of
it, to some extent at least, or under some circumstances, or in
reference to some of the parties who might otherwise have enjoyed
it. And it has appeared to me,, that if Congress had undertaken
to deny altogether the exercise of this writ by the federal courts,
or to limit its exercise to the few and rare cases that might per-adventure find their way to some one particular court, or to declare
that the writ should only issue in this or that class of cases, to the
exclusion of others in which it might have issued at the common
law, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion, that the ancient
and venerated privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had not been
in some degree suspended, if not annulled.
But there has been no legislation or attempted legislation by
Congress, that could call for an expansion of this train of reasoning.
There was one other writ, which, in the more recent contests between the people and the king, had contributed signallyto the maintenance of popular right. It was the writ of scire facias, which had
been employed to vindicate the rights of property, by vacating the
monopolies of the crown. Like the writ of habeas corpus, it founded
itself on the concessions of Magna Charta; and the two were the
proper and natural complements of each other.
The first Congress so regarded them. The protection of the citizen against arbitrary exaction and unlawful restraint, as it is the
essential object of all rightful government, would present itself as
the first great duty of the courts of justice that were about to be
1,,The

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when

in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."

Art. 1,

9, par. 1.

Const. U. S.
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constituted. And if, in defining their jurisdiction, it were thought
proper to signalize two writs, out of the many known to the English law, as within the unqualified competency of the new tribunals,
it would seem natural that those two should be selected, which
boasted their origin from the charter of English liberties, and had
been consecrated for ages in the affectionate memories of the people as their safeguard against oppression.
This consideration has interpreted for me the terms of the statute,
which define my jurisdiction on this subject. Very soon after I had
been advanced to the Bench, I was called upon to issue the writ of
habeas corpus, at the instance of a negro, who had been arrested as
a fugitive from labor. It was upon the force of the argument, to
which I now advert, that I then awarded the process; and from that
day to this, often as it has been invoked and awarded in similar
cases that have been before nfe, my authority to award it has never
been questioned.
The language of the act of Congress reflects the history of the
constitutional provision. It enacts (First Congr., Sess. 1, ch. 20,
see. 14) "that all the before mentioned courts of the United States"
(the Supreme, Circuit and District,) "shall have power to issue writs
of scire facias habeas corpus and all other writs not specially provided for by statute which may be necessary for the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law."
I am aware that it has sometimes been contended or assumed,
without, as it seems to me, a just regard to the grammatical construction of these words, that the concluding limitation applies to all
the process of the courts, the two writs specially named among the
rest ; and that the federal courts can only issue the writ of habeas
corpus, when it has become necessary to the exercise of an otherwise
delegated jurisdiction ; in other words, that it is subsidiary to some'
original process or pending suit.
It is obvious, that if such had been the intention of the lawmakers, it was "unnecessary to name the writ of habeas corpus at
all; for the simpler phrase, "all writs necessary, &c." would in
that case have covered their meaning. But there are objections to

UNITED STATES vs. WILLIAMSON.

this reading more important than any that found themselves on
grammatical rules.
The words that immediately follow in the section, give the power
of issuing the writ to every judge, for the purpose of inquiring into
the causes of a commitment. Now, a commitment presupposes
judicial action, and this action it is the object of the writ to review.
Can it be, that a single judge, sitting as such, can re-examine the
causes of a detainer, which has resulted from judicial action, and is
therefore rilma facie a lawful one ; and yet that the court, of which
he is a member, cannot inquire into the causes of a detainer, made
without judicial sanction, and therefore primafacie unlawful ?
Besides, if this were the meaning of the act, it might be difficult
to find the cases to which it should apply. I speak of the writ of
habeas cortus ad subjiciendum, the great writ of personal liberty,
referred to in the constitution ; not that modification of it which
applies specially to the case of a commitment, nor the less important
forms of habeas corpus, ad respondendum, adfaciendum, &c., which
are foreign to the question. I do not remember to have met a case,
either in practice or in the books, where the writ ad subjiciendum
could have performed any pertinent office in' a pending suit. There
may be such, but they do not occur to me; and I incline very
strongly to the opinion, that if the power to issue the writ of habeas
corpus applies only to cases of statutory jurisdiction, outrages upon
the rights of a citizen can never invoke its exercise by a federal court.
If such were indeed the law of the United States, I do not see
how I could escape the conclusion, that the jealousy of local interests
and prejudice, which led to the constitution of federal courts, regarded only disputes about property ; and that the liberty of a citizen, when beyond the State of his domicil, was not deemed worthy
of equal protection. From an absurdity so gross as this, I relieve
myself by repeating the words of Chief Justice Marshall, in ex
parte Tatsins, 3 Pet. 201: "No law of the United States prescribes the cases in which this great writ shall be issued, nor the
power of the cour't over the party brought up on it,"
Whether, then, I look to the constitution, and its history, or -to
the words or the policy of the act of Congress, I believe that it was
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meant to require of the Courts of the United States, that they should
dispense the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus to all parties
lawfully asserting them, as other courts of similar functions nd
dignity had immemorially dispensed them at the common law. The
Congress of 1789 made no definition of the writ, or of its conditions, or effects. They left it as the constitution left it, and as it
required them to leave it, the birthright of every man within the
borders of the States ; like the right to air, and water, and motion,
and thought, rights imprescriptible, and above all legislative discretion or -caprice.
And so it ought to be. There is no writ so important for good,
and so little liable to be abused. At the worst, in the hands of a
corrupt or ignorant judge, it may release some one from restraint
Who should justly have remained bound. But it deprives no one
of freedom, and devests no right. It could not give to Mr. Wheeler
the possession of his slaves, but it might release them from the
custody of a wrong-doer. Freemen or bondsmen, they had rights;
and the foremost of these was the right to have their other rights
adjudicated openly and by the tribunals of the land. And this
right at least, Mr. Wheeler shared with them; he also could claim
a hearing.
Unless these views are incorrect throughout, the District Court
had jurisdiction of the case, which came before it at the instance of
Mr. Wheeler. He represented in substance, by his petition under
oath, that three human beings had been forcibly taken possession of
by Passmore Williamson, without authority of law, within the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania; and he prayed, that by force
of the writ of habeas corpus, Mr. Williamson might be required
to produce their bodies before the court, and to declare what was
the right or pretext of right, under which he claimed to detain
them.
Whether Mr. Wheeler was in fact entitled to demand this writ,
or -whether upon a full discussion of the law the court might have
felt justified in refusing it to him, is a question of little moment.
Every day and in every court, writs issue at the instance of parties
asserting a grievance, and very often when in truth no grievance
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has been sustained. The party assailed comes before the court in obedience to its process. ie perhaps questions the jurisdiction of the court.
Perhaps he denies the fact charged. Perhaps he explains that the
fact, as charged, was by reason of circumstances a lawful one.
The judge is not presumed to know beforehand, all the merits of
the thousand and one causes that come before him: he decides
when he has heard. But the first duty of a defendant, in all cases,
is obedience to the writ which calls him into court. Till be has
rendered this, the judge cannot hear the cause, still less pass upon
its merits.
.Mr. Williamson dame before the court; but he did not bring
forth' the bodies of his alleged prisoners, as the writ had commanded
him. He did not question the jurisdiction of the court : he did not
assert that the negroes were free, and that the writ had been
applied for without their authority or consent: but lie simply denied
that they had ever been in his custody, power or possession, as
Mr. Wheeler asserted.
Witnesses were heard, and, with one consent, they supported the
allegations of Mr. Wheeler, and contradicted the denial of Mr. Williamson.
2Mr. Williamson's counsel then asked time to enable them to
produce witnesses who were material on his behalf; remarking that
their client might desire to bring the negroes into court, to prove
that they had not been abducted. The judge informed them, in
reply, that upon Mr. Williamson making the customary affidavit
that there were material witnesses whom he wished to adduce, the
cause would be continued, as of course, till a future day. Mr.
Williamson declined making the affidavit.
He however asked leave to declare for himself what he had
done, and why. He was heard, and, speaking under solemn affirmation, he not only verified all the important facts that had been
sworn to by Ir. Wheeler and the witnesses, but added that immediately before coming into court with his return, he had called upon
a negro who had been his principal associate in the transaction, to
ascertain whether the negroes were "safe," and had been informed
by him that they were " all safe."
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Two motions were then made by Mr. Wheeler's counsel; the
first, that Mr. Williamson should be committed for a contempt of
process, in that he had made a false return to the writ; the second,
that he should be held to answer to a charge of perjury. He summed up the evidence, and referred to authorities in support of
these motions. The counsel of Mr. Williamson then asked leave to
consult together as to their appropriate course of action; and this
being assented to by the Court, they retired with their client for
the purpose, from the court room. Returning after some time, they
informed the court that they' declined making any' argument upon
the questions which were before it.
The case, which was in this manner thrown upon the court for
its unaided adjudication, had assumed an aspect of grave responsibility on the part of Mr. Williamson. It was clearly in proof that
the negroes had been removed by persons acting under his counsel,
in his presence, and with his co-operation: his return/ to the writ
denied that they had ever been within his possession,' custody, or
control. Under ordinary circumstances, this denial would have
been conclusive; but being controverted by the facts in evidence, it
lost that character. "The court," said Judge Story, in a case
singularly analogous in its circumstances, (U. S. vs. Green, 8
Mas. 483,) "will not discharge the defendant, simply because he
declares that the infant is not in his power, possession, control or
custody, if the conscience of the court is not satisfied that all the
material facts are fully disclosed. That would be to listen to mere
forms, against the claims of substantial justice, and the rights of
personal liberty in the citizen. In ordinary cases, indeed, such a
declaration is satisfactory and ought to be decisive, because there
is nothing before the court upon which it can ground a doubt of its
entire verity, and that in a real and legal sense the import of the
words "possession, power, or custody," is fully understood and met
by the party. The cases of the King vs. Vinton, 5 T. R., 89, and
of Stacey, 10 Johns. 328, show with what jealousy, courts regard
returns of this nature. In these cases, there was enough on the
face of the returns to excite suspicions that more was behind, and that
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the party was really within the constructive control of the defendant. Upon examining the circumstances of this case, I am not
satisfied that the return contains all those facts within the knowledge of the defendant, which are necessary to be brought before
the court, to enable it to decide, whether he is entitled to a discharge; or in other words, whether he has not now the power to
produce the infant, and control those in whose custody she is."
"There is no doubt," he adds, " that an attachment is the proper process to bring the defendant into court."
Anxious that this resort to the inherent and indispensable powers of the court might be avoided, the judge, in adjourning the case
for advisement until the following week, urged upon Mr. Williamson and his associates, that if practicable, the negroes should, in
the meantime, be brought before the court.
But the negroes were not produced. They came forward afterwards, some of them, as it is said, before a justice in New York;
and by a process of a Pennsylvania State court, they or some of
them were brought forward again in this city, to testify for Mr.
Williamson or some of his confederates. But before the Court of
the United States, sitting within the same curtilage, at the distance
of perhaps a hundred yards, it was not thought necessary or expedient or practicable to produce them. Their evidence, whatever
might have been its import or value, was never before the court,
and could have no bearing upon its action.
The decision was announced at the end of the week. It was,
that Mr. Williamson's answer was evasive and untrue; that he,
therefore, had not obeyed the writ of habeas corpus, and must consequently stand committed as for a contempt of it. The order to
that effect having been made, a discussion arose between the counsel as to the propriety of certain motions, which on one side and the
other they invited the court to consider.
It was apparent, that the learned gentleman who at this time
addressed the court on behalf of Mr. Williamson, as his senior
counsel, was imperfectly prepared to suggest any specific action
either for the bench, or for his client. His remarks were discur-

UNITED STATES vs. WILLIAMSON.

sive; and when invited to reduce his motion to -writing, according
to the rules of practice, he found difficulty in defining its terms.
This led to an intimation on the part of the judge, that, inasmuch
as the opinion was in writing, and would be printed in the newspapers of the afternoon, it might be best for the counsel to examine its
positions before submitting their motion. The intimation was received
courteously. The question was asked whether the court would be
in session on one or another of days that were named; and the
reply was given, that upon a note being left at the Clerk's office at
any time, the judge would be in attendance to hear and consider
whatever motions the counsel might see proper to lay before him.
This was the last of the case. No motion was made; no further
intimation given on the part of Mr. Williamson or his counsel, of a
wish to make one.
Commitments for contempt, like the contempts themselves, may
be properly distributed in two classes. Either they are the punishment for an act of misconduct, or it is their object to enforce the
performance of a duty. The confinement in the one case is for a.
fixed time, supposed to be commensurat6 with the offending; in the
other, it is without prescribed limitation, and is determined by the
willingness of the party to submit himself to the law.
In the case of Mr. Williamson, the commitment is for a refusal
to answer ; that is to say, to make a full and lawful answer to the
writ of habeas corpus, an answer setting forth all the facts within
his knowledge, which are necessary to a decision by the court,
"whether he had not the power to produce the negroes, and control those in whose custody they were." He is now undergoing
restraint, not punishment. Immediately after the opinion was read,
lie was informed, in answer to a remark from his counsel, that the
commitment was "during th~e contempt :" the contempt of the party
and the order of the court consequent upon it, determine together.
This is all that I conceive it necessary to say of the .strictly judicial action in the case. The opinions, announced by the judge
upon other points, may perhaps be regarded as merely dicta. But
it had appeared from the defendant's declarations when upon the
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stand, that he supposed Mr. Wheeler's slaves to have become free,
and that this consideration justified his acting towards them as he
had done. It seemed due to him, that the court, believing as it did
those views to be incorrect, should not withhold an expression of its
dissent from them. Several succinct positions were accordingly
asserted by the judge: two of which may invite a few additional
remarks at this time.
"I know of no statute of Pennsylvania," the judge said, "which
affects to devest the rights of property of a citizen of ]orth Carolina,
acquired and asserted under the laws of that State, because he has
found it needful or convenient to pass through tho territory of
Pennsylvania; and I am not aware that any such statute, if such a
one were shown, could be recognized as valid in a court of the
United States."
The first of these propositions may be vindicated easily. By the
common law, as it came to Pennsylvania., siaverywas a familiar institution. Only six days after the first legislative assembly met in
Philadelphia, and thirteen days before the great charter was signed,
the council was engaged in discussing a law "to prevent the escape
of runaways ;" and four days later, it sat judicially, William Penn
himself presiding, to enforce a contract for the sale of a slave,
1 Colonial Records, 6.3.1 The counties of New Castle, Kent, and
Sussex, which were at that time and for many years after annexed
to Pennsylvania, and governed by the same law, continue to recognize slavery up to the present hour. It survived- in our Commonwealth, as a legally protected institution, until some time after the
census of 1840 ; so cautiously did the act of 1780, for its gradual
abolition among us, operate upon the vested interests of our own
slave owners.
I "At a council, held at Philadelphia, ye 29th 1st mo., 1683.

Present, William

Penn, Proprietary, and Governor of Pennsylvania and counties annexed, Thos.
Holmes, John Richardson, William Clarke, John Simcox, James Harrison, (and
eight others.)
"The petition of Nathaniel Allen was read, shewing that he had sould a servantto
Henry Bowman, for six hundred weight of beefe, with ye hide and tallow, and six
0
pounds sterling, which yV said Bowman delayed to pay y said petitioner, showing
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That act excepted from the operation of its provisions the domestic slaves of delegates in Congress, of foreign ministers, of persons
passing through, or sojourning in the State, and not becomilig residents therein, provided such slaves were not retained in the State
longer than six months. The act of 1847 repealed so much of the
act of 1780 as authorized masters and owners of slaves to bring
and retain their slaves within the Commonwealth for the period of
six months, or for any period of time whatever. But it did not
affect to vary or rescind the rights of slave owners passing through
our territory. It applied to persons resident and persons sojourning, who brought and sought to retain their slaves here; for over
such persons and their rights of property the State had lawful
dominion: but it left the right of transit for property and person,
over which it had no jurisdiction, just as it was before, and as it
stood under the constitution of the United States and the Law of
Nations.
This brings me to the second part of the position affirmed in the
court's opinion, namely: the right of a citizen of one State to pass
freely with his slaves through the territory of another State, in
which the institution of slavery is not recognized.
I need not say, that before the compact of union was formed
between the States, each of them was an absolutely sovereign and
independent community; and that, except so far as their relations
to each other and to foreign nations have been qualified by the
Federal Constitution, each of them remain so. As such, it is bound
likewise that yO said Henry Bowman and Walter Humphrey hired a boat of the
said petitioner only for one month, and kept the same boat 18 weeks from the
petitioner to his great prejudice: Then it was ordered, that William Clarke, John
Simcox and James Harrison should speak to Henry Bowman concerning this matter."-p. 62.
The Great Charter was signed by William Penn, 2dday, 2d mo., 1683, (seep. 72.)
A practice analogous to the Fugitive Slave Law of modern times seems to be referred to in the following minute, at p. 147 of the same volume.
" 24th 5 mo., 1685. William Hague requests the secretary, that an hue and cry
from East Jersey after a servant of lifr. John White's, a merchant at New York,
might have some force and authority to pass this province and territories: the secretary indorsed it, and sealed it with y' seal of this province."
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by that great moral code, which, because of its universal obligation,
is called the Law of Nations. What it could not do if freed from
federative restrictions, it cannot do now: every restraint qpon its
policy, which duty to other States would in that case involve, binds
it still, just as if the union had been dissolved or had never been
formed.
All the statists unite in regarding the right of transit for person
and property through the territory of a friendly State, as among
those which cannot, under ordinary circumstances, be denied. Yattel,
B. 2, ch. 10, §132, 3, 4; Puffendorf, B. 2, ch. 3, § 5, 67; Rutherf.
Inst. B. 2, ch. 9; 1 Kent Com. 33, 35. It is true that the right is
not an unqualified one. The State may impose reasonable conditions upon its exercise, and exact guaranties against its abuse. But
subject to these limitations, it is the right of every citizen of a
friendly State.
The right is the same, and admits just the same qualifications, as
to person and to property. The same argument, that denies the right
of peacefully transmitting one's property through the territories of
a State, refuses the right of passage to its owner. And the question, what is to be deemed property in such a case, refers itself
necessarily to the law of the State from which the citizen brings it:
a different test would sanction the confiscation of property at the
will of the sovereign through whose territory it seeks to pass. If
one State may decree that there shall be no property, no right of
ownership in human beingq; another, in a spirit of practical philanthropy only a little more energetic, may deny the protection of law
to the products of slave labor; and a third may denounce a similar
outlawry against all intoxicating liquids: And if the laws of a
State can control the rights of property of strangers passing through
its territory; then the sugar of New Orleans, the cotton of Carolina,
the wines of Ohio, and the rum of New England may have their
markets bounded by the States in which they are produced; and
without any change of reasoning, New Jersey may refuse to citizens
of Pennsylvania the right of passing along her railroads to New
York. The doctrine is one that was exploded in Europe more than
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four hundred and fifty years ago, and finds now, or found very lately,
its parting illustration in the politics of Japan.
It was because, and only because, this right was acknowledged by
all civilized nations, and had never been doubted among the American
colonies-because each colony had at all times tendered its hospitalities freely to. the rest, cherishing that liberal commerce which
makes a brotherhood of interest even among alien States; it was
because of this, that no man in the convention or country thought
of making the right of transit a subject of Constitutional guaranty.
Everything in and about the Constitution implies it. It is found in
the object, "to establish a more perfect union," in the denial to
the States of the power to lay duties on imports, and in the reservation to Congress of the exclusive right to regulate commerce among
the States.
This last power of the general government according to the
repeated and well considered decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, from Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Peters, to the Passenger
cases, 7 Howard, applies to intercourse as well as navigation, to the
transportation of men as well as goods, of men who pass from State
to State involuntarily, as of men who pass voluntarily; and it
excludes the right of any State to pass laws regulating, controlling,
or afortiori,prohibiting such intercourse or transportation. I do
not quote the words of the eminent judges who have affirmed this
exposition of the Constitution; but it is impossible to read their
elaborate opinions, as they are found in the reports, without recognizing this as the fixed law of the United States.
It needs no reference to disputable annals, to show that when the
Constitution was formed in 1787, slaves were recognized as property,
throughout the United States. The Constitution made them a distinct element in the distribution of the representative power and in
the assessment of direct taxes. They were known and returned by
the census, three years afterwards, in sixteen out of the seventeen
States then embraced in the Union; and as late as the year 1830,
they were found in every State of the original thirteen. How is it
possible then, while we assert the binding force of the constitution
by claiming rights under it, to regard slave property as less effec-
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tively secured by the provisions of that instrument than any other
property which is recognized as such by the law of the owner's
domicil ? How can it be, that a State may single out this one sort
of property from among all the rest, and deny to it the right of
passing over its soil-passing with its owner, parcel of his travelling
equipment, as much so as the horse he rides on, his great coat, or
his carpet bag?
We revolt in Pennsylvania, and honestly no doubt, at this association of men with things as the subjects of property; for we have
accustomed ourselves for some years-now nearly fifteen-to regard
men as men, and things as things: sub modo,however; for we distinguish against the negro much as our forefathers did; and not
perhaps, with quite as much reason. They denied him civil rights,
as a slave: w'e exclude him from political rights, though a freeman.
Yet no stranger may complain of this. Our constitutions and
statutes are for ourselves, not for others. They reflect out sympathies, and define our rights. But as to all the rest of the world;
ortions especially, towards whom we are bound by the
supreme law" of the federal constitution; they are independent
of our legislation, however wise or virtuous it may be; for they
were not represented in our conventions and assemblies, and we do
not permit them to legislate for us.
Whether any redress is provided by the existing laws of Pennsylvania for the citizen of another State, whose slaves have escaped
from him while he was passing through our territory, it is not my
province to inquire. It is quite probable that he may be denied
recourse to the courts, as much so as the husband, or father, or
guardian, whose wife, or child, or ward, has run away. He may find
himself referred back to those rights, which annex themselves
inseparably to the relation he occupies, the rights of manucaption
and detainer. These, I apprehend that he may assert and exercise
anywhere, and with such reasonable force as circumstances render
necessary. And I do not suppose that the employment of such
reasonable force could be regarded as a breach of the peace, or the
right to employ it as less directly incident to his character of master than it might be to the corresponding character in either of the
-'
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analogous relations.

Ina word, I adopt fully on thispoint the views

so well enforced by Judge Baldwin, in the case of Joh~nson vs.
Tompkins, Ba.ldw., 578, 9:
"The right of the master to arrest his fugitive slave, is not a solitary case in the
law. It may be exercised towards a fugitive apprentice or redemptioner to the same
extent, and is done daily without producing any excitement. An apprentice is a
servant, a slave is no more: though his servitude is for life, the nature of it is the
same as apprenticeship or by redemption, which, though terminated by time, is
during its continuance as severe a servitude as that for life. Of the same nature is
the right of a parent to the services of his minor children, which gives the custody
of their persons. So, where a man enters bail for the appearance of a defendant
in a civil action, he may seize his person at his pleasure, and commit him to prison;
or, if the principal escapes, the bail may pursue him to another state, arrest, and
bring him back, by the use of all necessary force and means of preventing an escape.
The lawful exercise of this authority in such cases is calculated to excite no sympathy: the law takes its course in peace, and unnoticed. Yet it is the same power,
and used in the same manner, as by a master over his slave. The right in such
case is from the same source, the law of the land. If the enforcement of the right
excites more feeling in one case than the other, it is not from the manner in which
it is done, but the nature of the right which is enforced, property in a human being
for life. If this is unjust and oppressive, the sin is on the makers of laws which
tolerate slavery: to visit it on those, who have honestly acquired, and lawfully hold.
property under the guarantee and protection of the laws, is the worst of all oppression, and the rankest injustice towards our fellow men. It is the indulgence of a
spirit of persecution against our neighbors, for no offence against society or its laws,
but simply for the assertion of their own in a lawful manner.
"If this spirit pervades the country," he goes on to say: "if public opinion is
suffered to prostrate the laws which protect one species of property, those who lead
the crusade against slavery, may at no distant day find a new one directed against
their lands, their stores, and their debts: If a master cannot retain the custody of
his slave, apprentice, or redemptioner, a parent must give up the guardianship
of his children, bail have no hold upon their principal, the creditor cannot arrest
his debtor by lawful means, and he, who keeps the rightful owner of lands or chattels out of possession, will be protected in his trespasses.
"When the law ceases to be the test of right and remedy; when individuals
undertake to be its administrators, by rules of their own adoption; the bands of
society are broken as effectually by the severance of one link from the chain of
justice which binds man to the laws, as if the whole was dissolved. The more
specious and seductive the pretexts are, under which the law is violated, the greater
ought to be the vigilance of courts and juries in their detection. Public opinion
is a security against acts of open and avowed infringements of acknowledged rights;
from such combinations there is no danger; they will fall by their own violence, as
the blast expends its force by its own fury. The only permanent danger is in the
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indulgence of the humane and benevolent feelings of our nature, at what we feel to
be acts of oppression towards human beings, endowed with the same qualities and
attributes as ourselves, and brought into being by the same power which created us
all; without reflecting, that in suffering these feelings to come into action against
rights secured by the laws, we forget the first duty of citizens of a government of
laws, obedience to its ordinances."

There was one other legal proposition affirmed in the opinion of
this court, but it cannot need argument. It was, that the question, whether the negroes were or were not freed by their arrival
in Pennsylvania, was irrelevant to the issue; inasmuch as whether
they were freed or not, they were equally under the protection of
the law, and the same obligation rested on Mr. Williamson to make
a true and full return to the writ of habeas corpus. Simple and
obvious as this proposition is, it covers all the judicial action in the
case. The writ required him to produce the negroes, that the court
might pass upon his legal iight to carry them off or detain them.
What questions might arise afterwards, or how they might be determined, was not for him to consider. His duty then, as now, was
and is to bring in the bodies; or, if they had passed bey6nd his
control, to declare under oath or affirmation, so far as he knew,
what had become of them: And from this duty, or from the constraint that seeks to enforce it, there can be no escape.
(See the argument of Sergeant Glynn, and the remarks of Air.
Justice Gould, in the ease of Mr. ilkes, 2 Wils. 154.)
The application immediately before me, hardly calls for these
expanded remarks; though, rightly considergd, they bear upon most
of the points that were elaborated in the argument upon the question of its reception. It purports to be a suggestion and petition
from a person now in Massachusetts, who informs the court that
she is one of the negroes who -escaped from Mr. Wheeler, that she
did so by Mr. Williamson's counsel, and with the sanction of his
presence and approval, but that he never detained her, nor has any
one since, and that she has never authorized an application for the
writ of habeas corpus in her behalf. Thereupon, she presents to
me certain reasons, founded as she supposes in law, wherefore I
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ought to quash the writ heretofore issued at the relation of Mr.
Wheeler.
When application was made to me for leave to file this paper, I
invited the learned counsel to advise me upon the question, whether
I could lawfully admit the intervention of their client. My thanks
are due to them for the ability and courteous bearing with which
they have discussed it. But I remain unconvinced.
The very name of the person who authenticates the paper is a
stranger to any proceeding tha t is or has been before me.' She
asks no judicial action for herself, and does not profess to have
any right to solicit action in. behalf of another: on the contrary,
her counsel here assure me expressly, that Mr. Williamson has
not sanctioned her application. She has therefore no status whatever in this court.
Were she here as a party, to abide its action, she would have a
right to be heard according to the forms of law; were she here as
a witness, called by a party,, her identity ascertained, she might be
examined as to all facts supposed to be within her knowledge. But
our records cannot be opened to every stranger who volunteers to
us a suggestion, as to what may have been our errors, and how we
may repair them.
I know that the writ of habeas corpus can only be invoked by
the party who is restrained of liberty, or by some one in his behalf.
I know, too, that it has been the reproach of the English courts,
that they have too sternly exacted proof, that the ^application was
authorized by the aggrieved party, before permitting the writ to
issue. But, as yet, the courts of the United States have, I think,
avoided this error. The writ issues here, as it did in Rome, 2 whenever it is shown by affidavit that its beneficent agency is needed.
It would lose its best efficiency, if it could not issue without a petition
from the party himself, or some one whom he had delegated to represent him. His very presence in court to demand the writ would, in
Neither the petition for the writ of habeas corpus, nor the writ itself, names
Jane .Johnmson.
2 "Interdictum omnibus competit.-Nerno

vere."-Dig. B. 43, T. 29, P 9.

enim prohibendus est libertati fa-
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some sort, negative the restraint which his petition must allege.
In the most urgent cases, those in which delay would be disastrous,
forcible abduction, secret imprisonment, and the like, the very
grievance under which he is suffering, precludes the possibility of
his applying in person or constituting a representative.
The
American books are full of cases,-they are within the experience
of every practitioner at the bar,-in which the writ has issued at
the instance of third persons, who had no other interest or right in
the matter than what every man concedes to sympathy with the
oppressed. I need only to refer to the case I have quoted from in
3 Mason, and the case of Stacy, in 10 Johnson, for illustrations of
this practice.
Of course, if it appears to the court at any time, that the writ
was asked for by an intermeddling stranger, one who. had' no
authority to intervene, and whose intervention is repudiated, the
writ will be quashed. But it is for the defendant, to whom the
writ is addressed, to allege L want of authority in the relator.
The motion to quash cannot be'the act of a volunteer. Still less
can it come to us by written suggestion, from without our jurisdiction, in the name of the party who is alleged to be under constraint, and whose very denial that she is so may be only a proof
that the constraint is effectual.
I may add, that I have examined all the authorities which were
brought before me by the learned counsel: with most of them I
was familiar before. But there is not one among them, which in
my judgment conflicts with the views I have expressed.
The application to enter this paper among the records of the

court, must therefore be refused.
Upon the reading of the above opinion, 'Mr. Cadwalader, as a
member of the bar of the court not counsel or attorney in the
original or subsequent proceedings, asked leave as amicus curie to
suggest that, in the Opinion of the court, an incident of the original
proceeding, which has been publicly misrepresented, was not
noticed.
"It has been publicly reported," Mr. Cadwalader said, " that after
the opinion of the court, which resulted in Mr. Williamson's commit-
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ment,had been read, his counsel applied to the court for leave to
amend his return, which leave was refused. The present suggestion
is made under the belief of thr member of the bar who makes it,
that this report was erroneous, and that what occurred was as follows. When the opinion in the original proceeding was read, the
counsel of Mr. Williamson asked if a motion to amend the return
would be received, and the court replied, that the motion must be
reduced to writing, and that it could not be received until the court's
order should be filed with the Clerk and recorded; adding that the
court would then receive any motion which the counsel for Msr. Williamson might desire to make. The court's order was then filed by
theClerk, and entered on record; but no motion to amend was then
or afterwards made, although the court paused to give an opportunity for making it, and invited the counsel then or afterwards,
to make any motion which their client might be advised to make."
Judge Kane said :-The recollections of Mr. Cadwalader concur substantially with my own. There certainly was no motion
made by the counsel of M1r. Williamson, for leave to amend his
return. A wish was expressed to make such a motion, and the
judge asked that the motion might be reduced to writing and filed.
But the motion was not drawn out or presented for the court's consideration, and the court never expressed any purpose to overrule
such a motion, if one should be presented.
S'a).reme Court of _Pennsylvania,-August, 1855.
EX PARTE PASSTMORE WILLIAMSON.

1

1. A writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed in the first instance, where it appears
on the face of the petition that the relator must be remanded at the hearing.
2. The legality of a commitment for contempt by one court, cannot be inquired into
by another court, especially one of a different sovereignty (as is the case between
the federal and state courts,) on habeas corpus or otherwise.
3. Nor is it material in such case that there was a want of jurisdiction over the
original proceeding, in the course of which the commitment for contempt was
made.

Kxox, J., dissenting.

This was a renewed application to the court in bane, for a writ of
habeas corpus in the case of Passmore Williamson, after its refusal
I Before LEwis, C. J., BLACK, WOODWARD, LowrlE, and Kxox, JJ.
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by Chief Justice Lewis, at chambers. See ante, vol. iii, p. 741.
The state of facts on which the decision was based, was the same.
BLACK,-J.-This is an application by Passmore Williamson for a
habeas corpus. He complains that he is held in custody under a
commitment of the District Court of the United States for a contempt of that court in refusing to obey its process. The process
which he is confined for disobeying, was a habeas corpus, commanding him to produce the bodies of certain colored persons claimed as
slaves under the law of Virginia.
Is he entitled to the writ he has asked for ? In considering what
answer we shall give to this question, we are, of course, expected to
be influenced, as in other cases, by the law and the Constitution
alone. The gentlemen who appeared as counsel for the petitioner,
and who argued the motion in a way which did them great honor,
pressed upon us no considerations except those which were founded
upon their legal views of the subject.
It is argued with much earnestness, and, no doubt, with perfect
sincerity, that we are bound to allow the writ, without stopping to
consider whether the petitioner has or has not laid before us any
probable cause for supposing that he is illegally detained-that
every man confined in prison, except for treason or felony, is entitled to it ex debito justtim-and that we cannot refuse it without a
frightful viulation of the petitioner's rights, no matter how plainly
it may appear, on his own showing, that he is held In custody for a
just cause. . If this be true, the case of ex parte Lawrence (5 Binn.
304) is not law. There the writ was refused, because the applicant
had been previously heard before another court. But if every man
who applies for a habeas corpus must have it, as a matter of right,
and without regard to anything but the mere fact that he demands
it, then a court or judge has no more power to refuse a second than
a first applicztion.
Is it really true that the special application, which must be made
for every writ of habeas corpus, and the examination of the commitment, which we are bound to make before it can issue, are mere hollow and unsubstantial forms ? Can it be possible that the law and
the courts are so completely under the control of their natural ene-
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mies, that every class of offenders against the Union, or the State,
except traitors and felons, may be brought before us as often as they
please, though we know beforehand by their own admissions, that
we cannot help but remand them immediately ? If these questions
must be answered in the affirmative, then we are compelled, against
our will and contrary to our convictions of duty, to wage a constant
warfare against the federal tribunals by firing off writs of habeas
corpus upon them all the time. The punitive justice of the State
would suffer still more seriously. The half of the Western Penitentiary would be before us at Philadelphia, and a similar proportion
from Cherry Hill and Moyamensing would attend our sittings at Pittsburg. To remand them would do very little good, for a new set of
writs would bring them all back again. A sentence to solitary confinement would be a sentence that the convict should travel for a
limited term up and down the State iii company with the officers who
might have him in charge. By the same means the inmates of the
lunatic asylums might be temporarily enlarged, much to their own
detriment; and every soldier or seaman in the service of the country could compel their commanders to bring them before the court
six times a week.
But the habeas corpus act has never received such a construction.
It is a writ of right and may not be refused to one who shows a
primafacie case, entitling him to be discharged or bailed. But he
has no right to demand it, who admits that he is in legal custody
for an offence not bailable; and he does make what is equivalent to
such an admission, when his own application and the commitment
teferred to in it, show that he is lawfully detained. A complaint
must be made, and the cause of detainer submitted to the court or
a judge, before the writ can go. The very object and purpose of
this is to prevent it from being trifled with by those who have
manifestly no right to be set at liberty. It is like a writ of error
in a criminal case, which the court or judge is bound to allow, if
there be reason to suppose that an error has been committed, and
equally bound to refuse, if it be clear that the judgment must be
affirmed.
We are not aware that any application to this court for a writ of'
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habeas corpus has ever been successful, where the judges at the time
of the allowance, were satisfied that the prisoner must be remanded.
The petitioner's counsel say that there is but one.reported case in
which it was refused (5 Binn. 304); and this is urged in the argument as a reason for supposing, that in all other cases, the writ was
issued without examination. But no such inference can be fairly
drawn from the scarcity of judicial decisions on a point like this.
We do not expect to find in reports so recent as ours, those long
established rules of lw which the student learns from his elementary books, and which are constantly acted upon without being
disputed.
The habeas corpus is a common law writ, and has been used in
England from time immemorial, just as it is now. The statute of
31 Car. II, c. 2, made no alteration in the practice of the courts in
granting these writs. (3 Barn. & Ald. 420-2; Chitty, 207.) It
merely provided that the judges in vacation should have the power
which the courts had previously exercised in term time (1 Chitty's
Gen. Prac., 686), and inflicted penalties upon those who should
defeat its operation. The common law upon this subject was brought
to America by the colonists; and most, if not all of fhe states, have
since enacted laws resembling the English statute of Charles H, in
every principal feature. The Constitution of the United States
declares, that " the privilege of a writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety may require it." Congress has conferred upon the federal
judges the power to issue such writs according to the principles and
rules regulating them in other courts. Seeing that the same gene-al principles of common law on this subject prevail in England
and America, and seeing also the similarity of the statutory regulations in both countries, the decisions of the English judges as well
as of the American courts, both state and federal, are entitled to
our fullest respect as settling and defining our powers and duties.
Blackstone (3 Com. 132) says the writ of habeas corpus should
be allowed only when the court or judge is satisfied that the party
hath probable cause to be delivered. ie gives cogent reasons why
it should not be allowed in any other case, and cites with unquali-
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fled approbation the precedent set by Sir Edward Coke and Chief
Justice Vaughan, in cases where they had refused it. Chitty lays
down the same rule. (1 Cr. Law, 101; 1 Gen'l Prac. 686-7.) It
seems to have been acted upon by all the judges. The writ was refused
in Rex vs. Scheiver (1 Bur. 765), and in the case of the Three
Spanish Sailors, (2 Black, 1324).
In Hobhozuse's case (3 Barn. & Aild. 420), it was fully settled
by a unanimous court, as the true construction of the statute, that
the writ is never to be allowed, if, upon view of the commitment, it
be manifest that the prisoner must be remanded. In New York,
when the statute in force there was precisely like ours, (so far I
mean, as this question is concerned,) bat was decided by the Supreme Court (5 Johns. 282), that the allowance of the writ was a
matter within the discretion of the court, depending on the
grounds laid in the application. It was refused in Rusted's case
(1 Johns. 136); and in Ez parte .Ferguson (9 Johns. 139).
In addition to this we have the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall
in Watkins' case (3 Peters, 202), that the writ ought not to be
awarded if the court is satisfied that-the prisoner must be remanded.
It was accordingly refused by the Supreme Court of the United
States in that case, as it had been before in Ifearneyj's case.
On the whole we are thoroughly satisfied that our duty requires
us to view, and examine the cause of detainer now and to make an
end of the business at once, if it appear that we have no power to
discharge him on the return of the writ.
This prisoner, as already said, is confined on a sentence of the
District Court of the United States for a contempt. A habeas corpus is not a writ of error. It cannot bring a case before us in such
a manner that we can exerise any kind of appellate jurisdiction in it.
On a habeas corpus, the judgment aven of a subordinate State
court cannot be disregarded, reversed, or set aside, however clearly
we may perceive it to be erroneous, and however plain it may be that
we ought to reverse it if it were before us on appeal or writ of error.
We can onlylook at the record to see whether a judgment exists, and
have no power to say whether it is right or wrong. It is conclusively
presumed to be right until it be regularly brought up for revision.
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We decided this three years ago at Sunbury, in a case which we
all thought one of much hardship. But the rule is so familiar, so
universally acknowledged, and so reasonable in itself, that it requires only to be stated. It applies with still greater force, or at
least for much stronger reasons, to the decisions of the federal
courts. Over them we have no control at all, under any circumstances, or by any process that could be devised. Those tribunals
belong to a different judicial system from ours. They administer a
different code of laws, and are responsible to a different sovereignty.
The District Court of the United States is as independent of us
as we are of it-as independent as the Supreme Court of the United
States is of either. What the law and the Constitution have forbidden us to do directly on writ of error, we, of course, cannot do
indirectly by habeas corpus.
But the petitioner's counsel have put his case on the ground
that the whole proceeding against him in the District Court, was
corant non judice, null and void. It is certainly true that a
void judgment may be regarded as no judgment at all; and
every judgment is void, whicf clearly appears on its own face
to have been pronounced by a court having no jurisdiction or
authority in the subject matter. For instance, if a federal
court should convict and sentence a citizefi for libel; or if a state
court, having no jurisdiction except in civil pleas, should try an indictment for a crime and convict the party :-in these cases the
judgments would be wholly void. If the petitioner can bring himself within this principle, then there is no judgment against him ; he
is wrongfully imprisoned, and we must order him to be brought out
and discharged.
What is he detained for ? The answer is easy and simple. The
commitment shows that he was tried, found guilty, and sentenced
for contempt of court, and nothing else. He is now confined in
execution of that sentence, and for no other cause. This was a distinct and substantive offence against the authority and government
of the United States. Does any body doubt the jurisdiction of the
District Court to punish the contempt of one who disobeys its process ? Certainly not. All courts have this power and must neces-
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sarily have it. Without it they would be utterly powerless. The
authority to deal with an offender of this class belongs exclusively
to the court in which the offence is committed, and no other court,
not even the highest, can interfere with its exercise, either by writ
of error, magdamus, or habeas corpus. If the power be abused,
there is no remedy but impeachment. The law was so held by this
court in MEcLaughlin's case (5 W.& S., 275), and by the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Kearney's ease (7 Wheaton, 38). It
was solemnly settled as part of the common law, in Brass Crosby's
case (3 Wilson, '183), by a court in which sat two of the foremost
jurists that England ever produced. We have not the smallest doubt
that it is the law; and we must administer it as we find it. The
only attempt ever made to disregard it was by a New York judge
(4 Johns. 845), who was not supported by his brethren. This attempt was followed by all the evil and confusion which Blackstone,
and Kent, and Story declared to be its necessary consequences.
Whoever will trace that singular controversy to its termination will
see that the chancellor and the majority of the Supreme Court,
though once outvoted in the Senate, were never answered.
The Senate itself yielded to the force of the truths which the
Supreme Court had laid down so clearly, and the judgment of the
Court of Errors in Yates' case (6 Johns. 503), was overruled by the
same court, the year afterwards, in Yates vs. Lansing (9 Johns.
423,) which grew out of the very same transaction, and depended
on the same principles. Still further reflection, at-a later period,
induced the Senate to join the popular branch of the Legislature in
passing a statute which qffectually prevepts one judge from interfering, by habeas corpus, with the judgment of another on a question of contempt.
These principles being settled, it follows irresistibly, that the
District Court of the United States had power and jurisdiction to
decide what acts constitute a contempt against it; to determine
whether the petitioner had been guilty of contempt, and to inflict
upon him the punishment, which, in its opinion, he ought to suffer.
If we fully believed the petitioner to be innocent-if we were sure
that the court which convicted him misunderstood the facts, or mis-
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applied the law-still we could not re-examine the evidence, or
rejudge the justice of the case, without grossly disregarding what
we know to be the law of the land. The judge of the district court
decided the question on his own constitutional responsibility. Even
if he could be shown to have acted tyrannically or cwrruptly, he
could be called to answer for it only in the Senate of the United
States.
But the counsel of the petitioner goes behind the proceeding in
which he was-convicted, and- argues that the sentence for contempt
is void, because the court had no jurisdiction of a certain other
matter which it was investigating, or attempting to investigate,
when the contempt was committed. We find a judgment against
him in one case; and he complains about another, in which there
is no judgment. ie is suffering for an offence against the United
States ; and he says he is innocent of any wrong to a particular
individual. He is conclusively adjudged guilty of contempt; and
he tells us that the court had no jurisdiction to restore Mr.
Wheeler's slaves.
It must be remembered that contempt of court is a specific criminal offence. It is punished sometimes by indictment, and sometimes in a summary proceeding, as it was in this case. In either
mode of trial, the adjudication against the offender is a conviction,
and the commitment in consequence is execution. (7 Wheat. 88.)
This is well settled, and, I believe, has never been doubted. Certainly the learned counsel for the petitioner has not denied it. The
contempt may be connected with some particular cause, or it may
consist in misbehaviour, which has a tendency to obstruct the administration of justice generally. When it is committed in a pending
cause, the proceeding to punish it is a proceeding by itself. It is not
entitled in the cause pending, but on the criminal side. (Wall, 134.)
The record of a conviction for contempt is as distinct from the
matter under investigation when it was committed, as an indictment
for perjury is from the cause in which the false oath was taken.
Can a person convicted of perjury, ask us to deliver him from the
penitentiary, on showing that the oath on which the perjury is as-
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signed, was taken in a cause of which the court had no jurisdiction?
Would any judge in the commonwealth listen to such reasons for
treating the sentence as void ? If instead of swearing falsely, he
refuses to be sworn at all, and he is convicted not of perjury, but of
contempt, the same rule applies, and with a force precisely equal.
If-it be really true that no contempt can be committed against a
court while it is inquiring into a matter beyond its jurisdictibn, and
if the fact was so in this case, then the petitionerhad agood defence,
and he ought to have made it on his trial. To make it after conviction is too late. To make it here is to produce it before the
wrong tribunal.
Every judgment mnut be conclusive until reversed. Such is the
character, nature, and essence of all judgments. If it be not conclusive it is not a judgment. A court must either have power to
settle a given question finally and forever, so as to preclude all further inquiry upon it, or else it has no power to make any decision
at all. To say that a court may determine a matter, and that
another court may regard the same matter afterwards as open and
undetermined, is an absurdity in terms.
It is most especially necessary that convictions for contempt in
one court should be final, conclusive, and free from re-examination
by other courts on habeas corpus. If the law were not so, our judicial systen! would break to pieces in a month. Courts totally unconnected with each other would be coming into constant collision.
The inferior courts would revise all the decisions of the judges placed
over and above them. A party unwilling to be tried in this court
need only defy our authority, and if we commit him, take out his
habeas corpus before a judge of the Common Pleas, and if that
judge be of opinion that we ought not to try him, there is an end
of the case.
This 'doctrine is so plainly against reason that it would be
wonderful indeed, if any authority for it could be found in
the books. There is none, except the overruled decision of Mr.
Justice Spencer, of New York, and some efforts of the same kind to
control the other courts, made by Sir Edward Coke, in the King's
Bench, which are now universally. admitted to have been illegal, as
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well as rude and intemperate. On the other hand, we have all the
English judges, and all our own, disclaiming the power to interfere
with, or control, one another in this way. I will content myself by
simply referring to some of the books in which it is established that
the conviction for contempt is a separate proceeding, and is conclusive of every fact which might have been urged on the trial for contempt, nd among others want of jurisdiction to try the cause in
which the contempt was committed. (4 Johns. 325, et sequ. The
opinion of Ch. J. Kent, on pages 370 to 375; 6 Johns. 563; 9
Johns. 423 ; 1 Hill, 160; 5 Iredell, 199 ; ib. 153; 2 Sandf. 724;
1 Carter, 160 ; 1 Blackf. 166 ; 25 Miss. 880; 2 Wheeler's Criminal Cases, 1; 14 Ad. & Ellis, N. S., 558.) These cases will
speak for themselves, but I may remark as to the last one,
that the very same objection was made there as here. The
party was convicted of contempt in not obeying a decree. He
claimed his discharge on habeas corpus, because the chancellor had
no jurisdiction to make the decree, being interested in the cause
himself. But the Court of Queen's Bench held that if this was a
defence, it should have been made on the trial for contempt, and the
conviction was conclusive. We cannot choose but hold the same
rule here. Any other would be a violation of the law which is
established and sustained by all authority and all reason.
But certainly the want of jurisdiction alleged in this case would
not even have been a defence on the trial. The proposition that a
court is powerless to punish for disorderly conduct and disobedience
of its process in a case which it ought ultimately to dismiss for want
of jurisdiction, is not only unsupported by judicial authority, but we
think it is new even as an argument at the bar. We ourselves have
heard many cases through and through before we became convinced
that it was our duty to remit the parties to another tribunal. But
we never thought that our process could be defied in such cases
more than in others.
There are some proceedings in which the want of jurisdiction
would be seen at the first blush; but there are others in which the
court -must inquire into all the facts before it can possibly know
whether it has jurisdiction or not. Any one who obstructs or baffles
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a judicial investigation for that purpose, is unquestionably guilty of
a crime, for which he may and ought to be tried, convicted and
punished. Suppose a local action to be brought in the wrong county,
this is a defence to the action, but a defeace which must be made
out like any other. While it is pending, neither a party, nor an
officer, nor any other person, can safely insult the court or resist
its order. The court may not have power to decide upon the
merits of the case; but it has undoubted power to try whether
the wrong was done within its jurisdiction or not. Suppose Mr.
Williamson to be called before the Circuit Court of the United
States as a witness in a trial for murder, alleged to be committed on the high seas; can he refuse to be sworn, and, at his
trial for contempt, justify himself on the ground that the murder
was in fact committed within the limits of a state, and therefore
triable only in a state court ? If he can, he can justify perjury for
the same reason. But such a defence for either crime has never
been heard of since the beginning of the world. Much less can it
be shown, after conviction, as a ground for declaring the sentence
void.
The writ which the petitioner is convicted of disobeying, was legal
on its face. It enjoined upon him a simple duty, which he ought to
have understood and performed without hesitation. That he did
not do so is a fact conclusively established by the adjudication which
the court made upon it. I say the writ was legal, because the Act
of Congress gives to all the courts of the United States, the power
"to issue writs of habeas corpus when necessary for the exercise of
their jurisdiction, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law."
Chief Justice Marshall decided, in Burr's trial, that the principles
and usages referred to in this act were those of the common law.
A part of the jurisdiction of the District Court consists in restoring
fugitive slaves; and the habeas corpus may be used in aid of it when
necessary. It was awarded here upon the application of a person
who complained that his slaves were detained from him. Unless
they were fugitive slaves, they could not be slaves at all,
according to the petitioner's own doctrine, and if the judge took
that view of the subject he was bound to award the writ.
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If the persons mentioned in it had turned out to be fugitives from
labor, the duty of the District Judge to restore them, or his power
to bring them before him on a habeas corpus, would have been disputed by none except the very few who think that the Constitution
and the law on that subject ought not to be obeyed. The duty of
the Court to inquire into the facts on which its jurisdiction depends
is as plain as its duty not to exceed it when it is ascertained.
But Mr. Williamson stopped the investigation in limine; and the
consequence is that every thing in the case remains unsettled-whether the persons named in the writ were slaves or free-whether
Mr. Wheeler was the owner of them-whether they were unlawfully
taken from him-whether the court had jurisdiction to restore
them-all these points are left open for want of a proper return.
It is not our business to say how they ought to be decided; but we
do not doubt that the learned and upright magistrate who presided
in the District Court would have decided them as rightly as any
judge in all the country. Mr. Williamson had no right to arrest
the inquiry because he supposed that an error would be committed
on the question of jurisdiction, or any other question. If the assertions which his counsel now make on the law and the facts be correct, he prevented an adjudication in favor of his protogees, and
thus did them wrong, which is probably a greater offence in his own
eyes than anything he could do against Mr. Wheeler's rights. There
is no reason to believe that any trouble whatever would have come
out of the case if he had made a true, full, and special return of all
the facts; for then the rights of all parties, black and white, could
have been settled, or the matter dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
if the law so required.
It is argued that the court had no jurisdiction, because it was
not averred that the slaves were fugitives, but merely that they owed
service by the laws of Virginia. Conceding, for the argument's
sake, that this was the only ground on which the court could have
interfered-conceding, also, that it is not substantially alleged in
the petition of Mr. Wheeler-the proceeding was nevertheless, not
void for that reason. The federal tribunals, though courts of
limited jurisdiction, are not inferior courts. Their judgments, until
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reversed by the proper appellate court, are valid and conclusive
upon the parties, though the jurisdiction be not alleged in the pleadings nor on any part of the record. (10 Wheaton, 192.) Even if
this were not settled and clear law, it would still be certain, that
the fact on which jurisdiction depends, need not be stated in thte
process. The want of such a statement in the body of the habeas
corpus, or in the petition on which it was awarded, did not give
Mr. Williamson a right to treat it with contempt. If it did, then
the courts of the United States must set out the ground of their
jurisdiction in every subpcena for a witness; and a defective or untrue averment will authorize the witness to be as contumacious as
he sees fit.
But all that was said in the argument about the petition, the writ,
and the facts which were proved, or could be proved, refer to the evidence in which the conviction took place. This has passed in rem
judicatam. We cannot go one step behind the conviction itself.
We could not reverse it if there had been no evidence at all. We
have no more authority in law to come between the prisoner and
the court to free him from a sentence like this, than we would have
to countermand an order issued by the commander-in-chief to the
United States army. We have no authority or jurisdiction to decide anything here, except the simple fact that the District Court
has power to punish for contempt, a person who disobeys its process-that the petitioner is convicted of such contempt-and that
the conviction is conclusive upon us. The jurisdiction of the court
in the case which had been before it, and everything else which
preceded the conviction, are out of our reach; they are not examinable by us, and, of course, not now intended to be decided.
There may be cases in which we ought to check usurpation of
power by the federal courts. If one of -them would presume, upon
any pretence whatever, to take out of our hands a prisoner convieted of contempt in this court, we would resist it by all proper and
legal means. What we would not permit them to do against us,
we will not do so against them. We must maintain the rights of
the State and its courts, for to them alone can the people look for
a competent administration of their domestic concerns; but we will
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do nothing to impair the constitutional vigor of the general government, which is "the sheet anchor of our peace at home and our
safety abroad."
Some complaint was made in the argument about the sentence
being for an indefinite time. If this were erroneous, it would not
avail here; since we have as little power to revise the judgment for
that reason as for any other. But it is not illegal, nor contrary to
the usual rule in such cases, It means commitment until the party
shall make proper submission. (3 Lord Raymond 1103; 4 Johns.
375.) The law will not bargain with anybody to let its courts
be defied for a specified term of imprisonment. There are many
persons who would gladly purchase the honors of martyrdom
in a popular cause at almost any given price, while others are
deterred by a mere show of punishment. Each is detained until
he finds himself willing to conform. This is merciful to the
submissive and not too severe upon the refractory. The petitioner, therefore, carries the key of his prison in his own pocket.
He can come out when he will, by making terms with the court
that sent him there. But if he choose to struggle for a triumphif nothing will content him but a clean victory or a clean defeathe cannot expect us to aid him. Our duties are of a widely different kind. They consist in discouraging, as much as in us lies, all
such contests with the legal authorities of the country. The writ
of habeas corpus is refused.
KNox J., dissented, and delivered an opinion, in which he announced the following propositions, as a summary of his argument:1st. That at common law, and by the Pennsylvania statute of
17 85, the writ of habeas corpus, ad subjiciendum is a writ of right,
demandable whenever a petition, in due form, asserts what, if true,
would entitle the party to relief.
2d. That an allegation, in a petition, that the petitioner is restrained of his liberty by an order of a judge or court without jurisdiction, shows such probable cause as to leavQe it no longer discretionary with the court or judge to whom application is made, whether the
writ shall or shall not issue.
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3d. That where a person is imprisoned by an order of a judge of
the District Court of the United States for refusing to answer a
writ of habeas corpus, he is entitled to be discharged from such imprisonment if the judge of the District Court had no autthority to
issue the writ.
4th. That the power to issue writs of habeas corpus by the judges
of the federal courts is a mere auxiliary power, and that no such
writ can be issued by such judges where the cause. of complaint intended to be remedied by it is beyond their jurisdiction.
5th. That the courts of the federal government are courts of
limited jurisdiction, derived from the Constitution of the United
States and the acts of Congress under the Constitution, and that
where the jurisdiction is not given by the Constitution or by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, it does not exist.
6th. That where it does not appear by the record that the court
had jurisdiction in a proceeding under the habeas corpus act to relieve from an illegal imprisonment, want of jurisdiction niay be established by parol.
Ith. That where the inquiry as to the jurisdiction of a court
arises upon a rule for a habeas corpus, all the facts set forth in the
petition tending to show want of jurisdiction are to be considered as
true, unless they contradict the.record.
8th. That where the owner of a slave voluntarily brings his slave
from a slave to a free State, without any intention of remaining
therein, the right of the slave to his freedom depends upon the law of
the State into which he is thus brought.
9th. That if a slave so brought into a free State escapes from
the custody of his master while in said State, the right of the master to reclaim him is not a question arising under the Constitution
of the United States or the laws thereof, and therefore, a judge of
the United States cannot issue a writ of habeas corpus, directed to
one who it is alleged, withholds the possession of the slave from the
master, commanding him to produce the body of the slave before
siid judge.
10th. That the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has no jurisdiction, because a contro-
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versy is between citizens of different States, and that a proceeding
by habeas corpus is in no legal sense, a controversy between private
parties.
11th. That the power of the several courts of the United States
to inflict summary punishment for contempt of court in disobeying
a writ of the court is expressly confined to cases of disobedience to
lawful writs.
12th. That where it appears from the record that the conviction
was for disobeying a writ of habeas corpus, which writ the court
had no jurisdiction to issue, the conviction is coram non judice and
void.'

. upreme Judicial Court of Mlassachusetts.-October Term, .1854.
CYNTHIA A. GREENE VS. ANDREW B. GREENE.'
A decree of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, although obtained by fraud, cannot be set aside on an original libel, filed at a subsequent term.

Libel for a divorce from the bonds of matrimony for five years'
desertion of the libellant by the respondent. The libel also set
forth, that the respondent, at the last November term of this court,
by false testimony, fraudulently procured a divorce from the libellant for the alleged cause of adultery. "Wherefore, in addition
to the prayer, which she now submits to this honorable court, to
be divorced from said Andrew as the law provides, she prays that
this honorable court will bear evidence of the fraud and collusion
by means of which said libel of divorce of said Andrew was by him
prosecuted, and the decree of divorce by him obtained against her,
and that the same may be reversed, annulled and set aside, and all
'After the decision of the court in this case, Chief Justice Lewis, stated that each
of the judges, who had concurred therein, would take a future opportunity of giving
their reasons for the course which they had pursued. These opinions, as well as
that of Judge Knox, which we are obliged to omit in the present number, for want of
space, we hope to publish hereafter.

2 To be published in 2 Gray's Reports,
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such further proceedings may'be had and ordered by this honorable
court, as to justice and truth shall appertain."
-E.L. Barneyr, for the libellant.
T. -D. Robinson, for the respondent.

0. J.-It will be perceived that this is an original libbl, by
wife against husband, alleging five years' desertion, and seeking on
that ground a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony. In
this libel, and as subsidiary to it, probably for the purpose of anticipating and obviating a probable defence, and showing that the
bond of matrimony still legally subsists, she sets forth a decree of
divorce d vinculo for adultery, obtained by her husband at a former
term, against her; she then avers, that the decree was obtained by
fraud and false testimony, prays the court to hear evidence of the
fraud and collusion by which the decree was obtained against her,
that the same may be reversed, annulled and set aside, and that
such proceedings may be had, &c. We can perceive no difference,
between the case, where a libellant inserts such an allegation and
prayer, in an original libel, by which she seeks a divorce d vinculo
on another ground, and a case where such allegation and prayer
are made the only subject of an original libel, to set aside a former
decree. The object in both cases is to reverse and annul a subsisting decree.
In using the term "collusion," in the present case, we presume
the libellant does not mean to use it in its ordinary sense, as collusion between the parties to the former proceeding, and so a fraud
upon the law, because that would include herself as party to the
fraud. As said by Willes, C. J., in Prudam vs. -Phillips,reported
in a note to Hargrave's Law Tracts, 456: "if both parties colluded in the cheat upon the. court, it was never known that either
of them could vacate the judgment."
We therefore understand this allegation as stating, that the husband "colluded," or combined, with other persons, to obtain false
testimony, or otherwise to aid the husband in fraudulently obtaining a decree.
We are then to understand this libel as an allegation that the
SnAw,
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former decree was obtained by the husband, by false testimony,
and fraud practiced by him, and on that ground praying a reversal
of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony, rendered by the
same court, between the same parties, at a former term, which had
terminated and closed.
Such a libel we think cannot be maintained. When the court
has jurisdiction of the subject matter, and of the parties, where
both parties are domiciled in Massachusetts, and the respondent
actually appears and defends, or where it appears to the court, that
the adverse party has been so legally summoned, as to be held
legally in default if he does not appear, and a decree is passed, dissolving the bond of matrimony, and no appeal, exception, or other
step taken to avoid the final judgment, we think it must in its
nature be conclusive upon the parties. Whether such final decree
is by our law open to any reversal, by review, writ of error, certiorari,or any other proceeding in the nature of an appeal, we give
no opinion; no such question, we believe, has been judicially decidef
or raised. Nor does this opinion apply to any case, where the fact
of the existence of the matrimonial relatioh between such parties,
at any particular time, is drawn in question between other parties.
We do not take into view a consideration sometimes adverted to
in English cases, which is, that the fact and legality of marriage
and divorce, are in England exclusively cognizable in the ecclesiastical courts; we place our opinion upon the more general doctrine
of res judicata, as settled in this commonwealth, and as applied to
the case'of divorce. We must inquire then, what would be the
consequence of any other decision? A binding .decree of divorce
d vinculo, determines the status of the parties. If valid and effectual, the innocent party has a right to marry again. If the husband be the innocent party, his after marriage would be lawful, his
wife would be entitled to dower and other rights of property, the
children would be legitimate and entitled to inherit, and various
other persons acquire or lose civil rights. If the decree is reversed,
it must be for a cause that shows it ought not to have been rendered; the reversal relates back, and declares the de~ree void ab
initio, and that the parties have never ceased to be husband and
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wife. The husband would be exposed to a prosecution for
polygamy,--e use this term rather than bigamy, because it is so
used in the statute, Rev. St., c. .130, sect. 2,-which is a state
prison offence; the wife has no right of property, in the real or
personal estate of the husband, the offspring are illegitimate, and
creditors and others may lose-rights of action.
On such new hearing, the wife might bring new evidence to show
that the evidence on which the former decree was rendered, was
false; or she may hope to persuade another tribunal, court or jury,
as the case may be, that the evidence formerly adduced, was not
entitled to be believed, and so effect a reversal of the decree. And
as there is no limitation of time, within which such new and original
libel must be filed, i may be after a lapse of months or years.
But if a new and original libel may be brought, upon the ground
that a former decree was obtained by false evidence, we see nothing
to prevent the husband from bringing a third suit to reverse the
dedree of reversal on a suggestion and offer of proof, that the decree
of reversal was obtained by perjury, subornation of perjury, and
other fraud, and so reverse the second decree, and re-instate the
original decree of divorce d vinculo.
Consequences are not always conclusive against a rule of positive
law; but where it is a question of construction, either of a statute
provision, or a rule of the common law, the c6nsequences to which
any particularsconstruction or application would lead, have a strong
bearing upon the question, what the legislature intended, or what
is the just extent and qualification of the rule. To maintain an
original libel in a case like this, would- seem to be *contraryto the
fundamental principles of judicial action.
But we think the point here, is settled by authority, not specifically in regard to divorce, but generally as to the conclusive effectof a judgment, in a case arising afterwards, on the same matter,
between the same parties. We take the rule to be, that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, having jurisdiction of the
sibject and of the parties, by legal process duly served, and where
no appeal, writ of error, certiorari, review or other legal process
for revising, affirming, or reversing such judgment exists, or where
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no such process is commenced by the party who would avoid the
judgment, in the mode and within the time prescribed by law, it is
conclusive upon the same parties in any other proceeding in law,
in equity, or before any other judicial tribunal.
Instead of numerous citations of authorities, we refer to Homer
vs. F isk, 1 Pick, 435, and the cases there cited. Some of the cases
are certainly calculated to put the rule to a severe test; as that of
Peck vs. Toodbridge, 3 Day, 86, where false testimony and forgery
were alleged, to impeach the former judgment; but the rule was
enforced, on the ground of its being necessary to the administration of justice. That when cases are once finally decided, that
must be held to be the end of litigation between the same parties.
The same rule is as steadily adhered to in chaficery. In Gelston
vs. Codwise, 1 Johns. 195, it is said by Ohancellor Kent: "If
a decree could be altered or varied by an original bill, a cause, as
it has been frequently observed, would never be at rest, and th ia
would be confusion and inconsistency in the decrees of the court.
It is no good exception to show, that the matter now offered did
not in fact come in question; such an exception, as said by Parker,
C. J., in Homer vs. Fish, would render the rule nugatory. It is
sufficient, that the action was of a nature to admit of such a defence, and that the plaintiff, in the new writ, might have availed
himself of it. 1 Pick. 441.
Most of the cases, supposed to have a contrary bearing, are those
where the fact or the legality of a particular marriage has been
drawn in question in a suit between third parties. The case of the
-Duchessof .Kingston, most fully reported in 20 Howell's State
Trials, 355, was an indictment for bigamy. The defence relied
upon, was, that before her second marriage with theDuke of Kingston, her former supposed marriage was adjudged void in a jactitation case in the ecclesiastical court; and her counsel insisted that
that decree was conclusive. The opinion of the judges was taken
by the House of Lords, which was, that such decree in a court of
competent jurisdiction, was conclusive between the parties, but not
so in a suit between other parties, and that on an indictment it was
competent for the crown to avoid the effect of the decree in ques-
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tion, by proving that it was obtained by the collusion of both parties, and a fraud upon the court, and such evidence was therefore
received, and the duchess was convicted.
The article cited as one of Mr. Hlargrave's Law Tracts, 451, was
an argument prepared with a view to the trial of that case. The
opinion of the judges affirmed one of the opinions maintained by
Mr. Hargrave in his treatise, and disaffirmed the other.
In the case already cited of 1Prudam vs. Phdllips, Hargrave's
Law Tracts, 456, note; Lord Oh. J. Willes, says that "whatever
objections would avoid a judgment in a court of common law, would
be sufficieht to overturn a sentence in the spiritual court, but none
others; that fraud was a matter of fact, and if used in obtaining
judgment, was a deceit on the court and hurtful to strangers, who
as they could not come in to reverse or set aside the judgment,
must of necessity be admitted to aver it was fraudulent. But
who ever knew a defendant plead, that a judgment obtained against
him was fraudulent."
The maxim that fraud vitiates every proceeding, must be taken
like other general maxims, to apply to cases whereproof of fraud is
adm issible. But where the same matter has been either actually
tried, or so in issue that it might have been tried, it is not again admissible; the party is estopped to set up such fraud, because the
judgment is the highest evidence, and cannot be controverted. But
a stranger may impeach a judgment which stands in his way, by
plea and proof of fraud in obtaining it, because it is his only means
of availing himself of the fraud.
There are several cases which have been supposed to have a bearing on this question, to which we will briefly 'refer. We have
already noticed Hargrave's Law Tracts, and the case of the Duchess
of Kingston.

The case" of Allen vs. Maclellan, 12 Penn. St. R., 328, was an
action of assumpsit, by an endorsee, on a note made payable to a woman, and endorsed by one pr6fessing to be her husband. It was
contended by the promisor, that he was not the true husband, and
certain decrees in matter of divorce were relied on. It was not,
therefore, a case between the parties to either decree.
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Colvin vs. Colvin, 2 Paige, 385, was a petition by both partiesafter a decree for a divorce had been enrolled, but for aught that
appears, at the same term, or at all events soon after-to open the
enrolment and set aside the decree; the party originally charging
adultery and claiming a divorce, stating his belief and conviction
from facts since come to his knowledge, that the adultery charged
had not been committed. The petition was granted, on the ground
that the party though he had a right to a divorce, might waive that
right, and that a condonation would take away the right, and restore the parties to marital relations. Dunn vs. Dunn, 4 Paige,
425, was a petition to set aside a decree of divorce entered on a bill
taken pro confesso, on the ground that by service of an original subpcena, out of the jurisdiction of the court, in another state, the court
did not acquire jurisdiction of the person of the respondent, and the
decree on the face of the proceedings was erroneous. It proceeded
on the ground that for want of legal service, and without an actual
appearance, the court had no jurisdiction. And the chancellor
says, "if the Court of Chancery has once acquired jurisdiction over
the party, by the service of original process within the jurisdiction
of the court, or by voluntary appearance, the decree or any order
in the cause, may be served on the defendant out of the jurisdiction."
And in another passage, he says "the vice chancellor was right in
deciding, that the service of a subpcena, at Newark, (N. J.) was not
sufficient to warrant the entry of an order to take the bill as confessed, for the want of appearance." The court, therefore, though
they had jurisdiction of the subject, had not by legal process acquired jurisdiction of the person. of the respondent.
We have seen no reliable authority opposed to the position above
taken, that a decree of divorce c2 vinculo, where no appeal, review,
or writ of error is allowed by law, or when the time for bringing
such review or writ of error has expired, is final and conclusive upon
the parties, and that an original proceeding to set it aside, on the
ground that itwas fraudulently obtained upon false evidence, cannot
be maintained.
NoTE.-The facts of the case of Allen vs. Maclellan, 12 Penn. St. 328, referred to in
the foregoing opinion, seem to have been somewhat misapprehended. The action there,
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though in form upon a promissory note, was in fact brought to test the power of
the Common Pleas of Philadelphia, to vacate, on the ground of fraud, a decree of
divorce which it had granted at a previous term. This was the main question
'before the Supreme Court, and it was decided in the affirmative, in a very able
opinion.; the conclusions of which are, to some extent, adverse to those" of Greene
vs. Greene. Allen vs. Maclellan, is a strong case, for there, the party obtaining the
divorce had subsequently married again, and had a child. We make this rectification, however, with the greatest respect for the learned court which decided the
principal case, and without any intention of questioning the propriety of its decision.-Ed. L. Reg.

.District Court, Ramilton County, Ohio-April, 1855.
ALTFRED STUNT VS. THE STEAMBOAT OHIO.'
1. The provision of the Constitution of the United States expressly conferring
appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, does not authorize the exercise of
appellate power by that tribunal, over the State courts, but extends simply to
appeals from the subordinate federal courts.
2. There is no provision in the Constitution, from which a supervising power in the
Supreme CQurt of the United States over the State courts, can be derived by
way of incident or implication.
3. The Supreme Court of the United States has not been constituted the exclusive
tribunal of last resort, to detdrmine all controversies in relation to conflicts of
authority between the federal government and the several States of the Union.
4. The State courts and the federal courts are co-ordinate tribunals, having concurrent jurisdiction in numerous cases, but neither having a supervising power over
the other; and where the jurisdiction is concurrent, the decision of that court,
or rather, of the courts of that judicial .system in -which the jurisdiction first
attaches, is final and conclusive as to the parties.

MR. JUSTICE BARTLEY

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This cause comes before us, at this time, on a motion to make an
entry on our journals by an order of court, certifying that on the
trial of the cause, the validity of a statute of the State of Ohio,
under the authority of which the suit was prosecuted, was drawn in
question, on the ground of its being repugnant to the constitution
and laws of the United States; that the decision of this question
' Before Mr. Justice BARTL-EY, of the Supreme Court, and Judges PARXER, CARTER
and VAN HAmm, of the Common Pleas.
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became necessary in the determination of the case; that it was decided in favor of the validity of the said law; and that this is the
higlest court of law and equity in the State, in which the parties
can, as a matter of right, have the case decided. This entry is
asked in order to lay the foundation for the removal of the cause
by way of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The suit was instituted under the authority of the statute of this
State for the collection of claims against steamboats and other
watercrafts, and authorizing proceedings against the same by name,
by which it is provided, that steamboats and other watercrafts shall
be liable for debts contracted on account thereof, for materials,
labor, &c., in the building or repairing of the same; and also,
among other causes of action, for any damage or injury done by
the captain, mate, or other officer thereof, to any person who may
be a passenger or hand on such boat or craft, at the time. The
plaintiff complains of an injury and damage done to him on board
the defendant, by the mate, an officer thereof, on the waters of the
Ohio river, out of this State, and while the boat was within the borders of the State of Indiana, and sailing under the authority of a
coasting license from the United States.
Some years ago the validity of this State law was questioned, on
the ground of an alleged conflict with the clause of the second section of the third article of the Constitution of the United States,
which provides that the judicial power of the United States, among
other cases, "shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction." And the judiciary act passed by Congress in 1789,
provides that the District Courts of the United States shall be invested with " exclusive. cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." It was adjudged, however, by the
Supreme Court of this State, in the case of Thompson vs. Steamboat Julius D. liforton, 2 Ohio S. Rep. 26, that this State law was
not unconstitutional; that it was competent for a State to authorize
a concurrent remedy by proceeding at common law, or by statute,
over causes of civil action within its jurisdiction, which constitute
grounds for proceeding in admiralty, in the federal courts; and
that the exclusive and original cognizance of all civil causes of
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admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred on the District
Courts of the United States was to be construed as EXCLUSIVE
only as between the District and the Circuit and other courts of
the United States. And this is understood to be in accordance
with the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of The Genesee Chief vs. Fitz H'ugh et al., 12
Howard, 124. And the correctness of these decisions is conceded
by the counsel making the motion now before us. But the validity
of the law is now questioned upon another and different ground.
It is insisted that the tort for which the plaintiff brought this suit,
is one for which the owner of the boat would not be liable in a proceeding in personan against him; and that to subject his boat to
the satisfaction of the liability of the officer for his wrong, would
be taking the property of one person to discharge the liability of
another, and therefore, o violation of the constitutional guaranty
of the inviolability of private property; and that especially, this
could not be.done for a tort committed on the boat while within
the jurisdiction of another State, nnd while engaged in the coasting trade under a license and enrollment, pursuant to the revenue
laws of the United States. And it is insisted that this question,
although it turns mainly on the construction to be given to the
constitution and statute of Ohio, is an appropriate one for the determination of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The first question which arises on this motion, is whether the
Supreme Court of the United States can exercise any supervisory
control by way of appeal or writ of error, over the adjudications
of a State court. If no such appellate power exists, we can have
no authority for making the entry requested, and it would be
improper to do so. It is said that the Supreme Court of the United
States has entertained appeals from this court, and also from the
Supreme Courts of the other States, on a similar entry, in cases
of recent occurrence involving the question of the validity of the
laws of this State taxing the property of banks. The entries made
in the Supreme Court of the State in the bank tax cases, which
were removed to the Supreme Court of the United States, were
entries drawn up and made by the consent and agreement of the
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parties. But the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States
would entertain the appeal from this court upon the certificate proposed, is not conclusive on the question before us. The existence
of such appellate power by the authority of the Constitution, is
necessary to warrant the record of such an entry in this court,
and, therefore, a matter to be passed upon by us on the motion under
consideration. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in favor of its own power, is entitled to great respect ; but,
however high the consideration due the decisions of that tribunal,
they cannot be above the reach of respectful examination and
inquiry into the reasons and authority upon which they rest, when
brought under review in the determination of a matter imposing the
duty of judicial action in a State court.
The question of the appellate power of the Supreme Court of
the United States over the Stvte courts, has recently acquired an
importance of great and vital interest in this State. In the exercise of this appellate power, that tribunal has recently assumed to
reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio, and annul a
State law, by declaring it unconstitutional, on a mere question of
the judicial construction to be given to the constitution and statutes
of the State; and that, too, in regard to a matter relating solely to
the local revenues of the State, and in nowise whatsoever, affecting the interests or due administration of the general government.
(See State Bank of Ohio vs. Knoop, 16 How. 369.) And under
this decision some fifty banking corporations in this State, with
an aggregate amount of taxable property exceeding twenty millions of dollars, are, at this time, claiming exemption from the
taxing power of the State, and successfully resisting the authority
of the State to exact an equal and just tribute of taxation from
them. The increasing and fearful interest and importance of the
question of the appellate power of the Supreme Court of the United
States over the State courts, has become such as to require the
most profound consideration. And as it is fairly and fully presented on the motion before us, we feel no disposition to shrink
from the responsibility of meeting it fairly and fully. And inasmuch as this appellate power is claimed upon the ground of great
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weight of authority, we .deem it not inappropriate, and indeed, no
less than a duty in expressing an opinion on it, to give the subject
a full, searching and thorough examination.
Does the Constitution confer any power on the federal governnient, by which the Supreme Court of the United States is authorized, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, to review and
reverse the judgment of a State court ?
It cannot be pretended that Congress can confer this power by
statute, without a delegation of authority in the constitution.
Under our system of government, a law originating in an exercise
of power not given by the constitution, is void. The United States
is a government 'of expressly defined and limited powers, and all
powers not delegated in the constitution, are expressly reserved. It
would be to little purpose, indeed, that the people should expressly
define and limit the powers of their government by a written constitution, if the limits prescribed could be passed by those intended
to be retained, and laws enacted without authority derived from the
constitution. "This doctrine," (in the language of Chief Justice
Mlarshall, in the case of Mar ury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137,)
would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It
would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and
theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare that if the legislature shall
do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express
prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence with the same breath which
professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at
pleasure; and thus reducing to nothing what we have deemed the
greatest improvement on political institutions-" a written constitution." It is incontestible, therefore, that if this power be not conferred by the constitution; it cannot be legitimately exercised.
We may here premise, that it is a settled rule of interpretation,
founded on sound reason, that every written instrument conferring
limited and expressly defined powers must be strictly construed ;
and that to warrant the exercise of special authority thus delegated,
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the grant of it, must appear affirmatively,and distinctively to be
within the terms of the prescribed limits. If this rule be important
in any instance, it is so in its application to the written constitution
of a government of limited and expressly defined powers. If the
exercise of doubtful authority, derived by vague and far-fetched
construction and implication, be warranted or allowed, a written
constitution will be of but little consequence as a restraint upon
ambition and cupidity. The rigid application of*the strict rule of
construction above mentioned, is also authoritatively required by
the ninth and tenth additional amendatory articles of the constitution, declaring that the powers not expressly delegated, are reserved,
and that the enumeration of certain rights in the constitution shall
not be construed to deny or disparage those retained. Without this
express requirement of a strict construction, the constitution would
not have been adopted by the states.
Bearing in mind, therefore, this rule of interpretation, we will
proceed directly to an examination of the question under consideration.
The whole judicial power of the federal government is conferred
by the third article of the Constitution. The first section of this
article prescribes the courts in which this judicial power is vested,
in the words following:
"Thejudicialpower of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during
good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."

The second clause of the second section of the article, distributes
the jurisdiction under which this judicial power is to be exercised
as follows :
"In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have originaljurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shal have
appellatejurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make."

These two provisions contained in the same article, and closely
connected in their relation to the same subject matter, must be
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construed together.

The whole jurisdiction conferred is vested in

the Supreme court of the United States, and the inferior courts
established by Congress. None of the judicial power of the United
States, therefore, can be exercised by any other courts than the
courts of the United States. No other courts but these are
mentioned in this article; and clearly none other could have been
in contemplation. In a few specified cases only, is original jurisdiction given to the Supreme court; as to all other cases, the
jurisdiction of that court is appellate. An appeal is the removal of
a suit-from the determination of an inferior court, to the jurisdiction of a superior court under the same judicial system. It is a
continuation of the same suit under the judicial power of the same
government, but under the jurisdiction of a higher court, than that
in which it has been once decided. Appellate jurisdiction is the
cognizance which a superior court takes of a case removed to it, by
appeal or writ of error from the decision of an inferior tribunal.
The power of the appellate court necessarily includes the power
not only to reverse 'the judgment, but also to control and direct the
subsequent action of the subordinate court. Appellate jurisdiction;
therefore, always implies the existence of subordinate courts in
the same judicial organization, over. which the court in which it is
vested exercises a supervising or correcting control. The appellate
jurisdiction, which is here vested in the Supreme Court of the
United States, is conferred in the same constitutional provision
which authorizes the establishment of the inferior federal courts,
as well as the Supreme Court; and of course has a direct reference
to appeals from the inferior federal courts, being the subordinate
courts under the same judicial organization. No other courts than
the United States courts are mentioned, or even alluded to in this
article of the Constitution ; and none other could have been contemplated. This constitutional provision is the fundamental law for
the organization of a judicial system. It vests all the judicial
power of the government in a Supreme Court, and certain inferior
courts belonging to this judicial organization. " No other judicial
system is mentioned.
The constitution contains no provision
creating any connection between this and any other judicial organi-
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zation. When therefore, this constitutional provision distributes
the judicial power of this system, by vesting appellate jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court, it would be a gross absurdity to say, that
this appellate jurisdiction could have reference to anything else
than appeals from the inferior tribunals here mentioned as belonging to the same system, and which are essential to make up the
organization of the courts in which the whole judicial power of the
United States is vested.
Where a constitution organizing fundamentally a judicial system,
divides it into one supreme, and so many inferior courts as the
legislative branch of the government may ordain and establish;
then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them,
as to define the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and to confer
upon it appellate jurisdiction, the plain import of the words is to
confer jurisdiction or a supervising control by appeal or writ of
error, over the judgments of-the subordinate tribunals here mentioned and established in the same connection, as a part of the same
organization. If the appellate jurisdiction here conferred had
reference to any other subordinate courts than those mentioned in
this provision of the constitution, language would certainly have
been used expressly including them. The judicial system of each
State is different and distinct from that of the federal government,
and ordained and established under a different constitution-originating from a different source, and distinct in its organization, it is
clothed with independent judicial power derived from the people of
the State, and wholly distinct from the judicial power of the United
States. If the appellate jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme
Court of the United States had reference to the removal of cases
by writ of error or appeal from the State courts, as well as the
inferior federal courts, it is fair to infer that the express mention
of them would not havb been omitted; and the State courts not
having been mentioned as subject to this appellate power, they are
excluded by a well settled and universal rule of interpretation.
Each of the States has always claimed to be sovereign and independent, and at the time of the formation of the Constitution of the
United States, each State was especially jealous of encroachments
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on its State sovereignty by the powers delegated to the federal
government. It is certainly by no fair or reasonable mode of interpretation, that the language of the constitutional provision above
recited, could make the courts of the States subject to the supervising control or the appellate power of the Supreme Court of the
United States, without the mention of them, or language clearly
and expressly including them.
But it has been argued, that the language of the Constitution
conferrinig appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of the United
States, is not expressly limited by reference to any particular subordinate courts, but general and restrained only by "1such exceptions and such regulations as the Congress shall make;" and that
therefore, the language of the Constitution does not limit this appellate" power to the inferior federal courts. This argument overlooks
one of the plainest and most common rules of interpretation. The
language of every instrument must be construed with reference to
the connection in which it is used, and the context and subject
matter to which it relates. The article of the constitution in which
this appellate jurisdiction is conferred, establishes a separate, distinct and independent judicial system, vests the whole judicial power
of the federal government in the federal courts, provides for a
Supreme Court and the inferior courts of the system, and in the
distribution of the jurisdiction, confers appellate jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court. Was it necessary to say in so many words that
the appellate jurisdiction here conferred applied only to proceedings
in the subordinate tribunals here mentioned and provided for,-the
tribunals belonging to the judicial organization in this connection
established,-tribunals exercising judicial power here conferred, a
part of which, and indeed a mere, continuation of which, after the
commencement of its original exercise, is the appellatejurisdiction
under consideration? It is clear that words specifically applying
this appellate jurisdiction to the proceedings of these subordinate
courts of the same organization, could not have made this constitutional provision plainer than it is. No other courts or judicial
system is in any manner referred to or even recognized as having
an-existence. This grant of appellate jurisdiction, therefore, taken
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in the connection in which it stands, has as plain and clear an
application to the supervising control over the subordinate federal
courts alone as express language could make. Such is the fair
and reasonable import of the whole article; and any other construction would not only violate a settled rule of interpretation, but
be at variance with reason and plain common sense.
The constitutional provisions for the establishment of the several
judicial systems for a number of the States, furnish practical illustrations of the interpretation here given to the Constitution of the
United States. The first section of the fourth article, in the Constitution of Ohio, is as follows:
"Thejudicial power of the State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in District
Courts, Courts of Common Pleas, Courts of Probate, Justices of the Peace, and in
such other courts, inferior to the Supreme Court, in one or more counties, ag the
Geuieral Assembly may from time to time establish."

The second section of the same article, continues:
"The Supreme Court shall consist of five judges, a majority of whom shall be necessary to form a quorum, or to pronounce a decision. It shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, and procedendo, and such other
appellatejuridictionas may beprovided by law.

Here a Supreme Court and certain subordinate courts are created,
and in the distribution of the judicial power, appellate jurisdiction
is conferred on the Supreme Court in general terms, without expressly mentioning the subordinate courts over whose proceedings
it shall be exercised. The provision here is substantially the same
with that in the Constitution of the United States, in regard to the
appellate jurisdiction. But did any one ever doubt as to the subordinate courts to which the appellate jurisdiction here conferred was
applicable ? ' Was it ever supposel, that it could be extended beyond
the subordinate courts mentioned in the same connection and authorized under the same judicial system ? What would be said of a legislative enactment in Ohio authorizing an appeal, or writ of error from
The subordinate federal courts sitting within the State, to the Supreme
Court of the State ? Would the Supreme Court of the United
States,-a tribunal which has never been wanting in a disposition
at least, to protect, to the utmost extent, the powers of the federal
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juciciary,-acquiesce in such an interpretation of the Constitution
of Ohio ? It certainly would not. And yet the language of the
Constitution of the State, and the relation of the State to the federal
government, would justify such an interpretation and sustain such
appellate power in the State court, upsn the very same ground
upon which this appellate power claimed for the Supreme Court ef
the United States rests.
The judicial system of each State is entirely distinct from that
of the federal government, and the judicial power of the federal
government being wholly distinct from the judicial power of each
State, it cannot be blended with it. All the judicial power vested
i'n the federal government, must, from the very nature of the grant,
be original, or capable of original cognizance of any case commenced under it. Without original, there can be no appellate
jurisdiction. The latter is a mere continuation of the judicial
power originally acquired or taken over the rights of the parties in
a suit. The authority given to Congress to ordain and establish
inferior courts, to any extent deemed proper, was evidently intended to enable the federal government, to provide subordinate
tribunals in each of the States, competent to take original cognizance of all matters of federal jurisdiction within its limits, so far
as the same might become necessary. The state courts were not
relied on as means of exercising any of the judicial power of the
United States, and no portion of it was vested in them by the Constitution of the United States. It has been settled by solemn adjudication, that Congress cannot, by law, impose jurisdiction on the
State courts, nor can the legislature of a state impose jurisdiction
on the United States courts. The exercise of appellate jurisdiction,
therefore, by the Supreme Court of the United States over the
State courts, is not only not provided for in the Constitution, but
incompatible with the theory of our government, and the distribution of power under it. Hence the express provision in the Constitution, that "the judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may ordain and establish,"-thusconfining the judicial
power of the federal government to the federal courts, by express
provision.
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But it is insisted that the power of the Supreme Court of the
United States, to control the judgments of the State courts, is
acquired by virtue of the first clause of the second section of the
third article of the Constitution, which isin these words:
" The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under
this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall
be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls; to all'cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between
two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State ; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under
grants of different States, and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign
States, citizens or subjects."

The effect of this provision, is not to'confer appellatejurisdiction,
but to define the objects, and limit the extent of the judicial power
of the United States. The judicial power mentioned, is of course
the judicial power of the United States as distinguished from that
of the several States; and it is extended only to the subjects specifically enumerated; so that the federal courts are cousts of limited,
and not qourts of general jurisdiction. Their jurisdiction is to
"extend to all cases arising out of the several matters specifically
enumerated. There is no expression used to give the judicial power
here conferred, any exclnsive character. The term "e x tend" means
to stretch, reach, or continue in any particular direction, (Webster's
Dictionary.) There is no meaning in the word. "extend," which
carries with it the exclusion of any thing else extending to the
same matter. It is in the nature of the jurisdiction of courts of
justice, that it never operates, till it is invoked by the institution
of a suit, or other proceeding in court. When, therofore, the judicial power is extended to any particular subject, it is simply empowered to take jurisdiction over it, whenever it is invoked by the
commencement ef a suit or other proceeding. Had the phraseology
of the constitution been as follows : the courts of the United States
shall have jurisdictionin all cases brought before them, touching
the several matters mentioned, instead of the language used, it is
very clear, that the same, and no different meaning would have been
expressed. The State courts are not mentioned nor referred to,
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nor do they appear to have been in contemplation, from any language used. The bare extension of the judicial power to all cases,
or which is the same thing, to all suits or proceedings which may
be instituted invoking its action, touching the enumerated subjects,
does not give any exclusive character to the power granted, so as
to exclude the concurrent jurisdiction of co-ordinate tribunals.
The object of a written constitution is to enumerate and distinctly describe the power delegated by the people to the government, so that they may not be left matters of doubt or conjecture.
Had it been the intention of the Constitution to exclude the concurrent jurisdiction of the State courts in the cases to which the
judicial power of the United States is extended, language would
certainly have been used, clearly manifesting such intention. But
as no such words are employed, and all powers not expressly conferred are reserved by the very terms of the Constitution, it is
plain and certain that no such exclusive jurisdiction is given by the
Constitution, to the federal courts.
Much hypercriticism has been expended on the words "all cases
in law and equity, arisingunder the Gonstitution,laws and treaties
of the United States," to which the federal jurisdiction is extended.
There is no occasion for any strained interpretation, or search for
far-fetched meaning to ascertain the plain import of the language
used. What constitutes "a ease" in law or equity, arising under
the Constitution, &c., is matter of legal interpretation. A ease in
law or equity is a suit or proceeding in court, invoking the exercise of
judicial power, and consisting as well of the parties as of their rights.
There is a manifest distinction between a question in law or equity,
and a case in law or equity. Although every case in law or equity
involves a question, yet many questions may arise seriously affecting
the rights of persons, which do not constitute a CASE in law or equity.
It appears that Chief Justice Marshall, when a member of Congress, in a debate in relation to the famous case of Jonathan Robbins, gave an exposition of the term "a case in law," as used in
the Con'stitution, in the following words:
"By the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States is extended to all
cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, laws and treaties of the Uni-
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ted States; but the resolutions declare the judicial power to extend to all questions
arising under the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States. The difference between the constitution and the resolutions was material and apparent. A
case in law or equity was a term well understood, and of LIMITED SIGNIFICATION. It
was a controversy between parties that had taken a shape for judicial decision. If
the judicial power extended to every question under the constitution, it would involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and decision: if to every
question under the laws and treaties of the United States, it would involve almost
every subject upon which the executive could act. The division of power, which
the gentleman had said could exist no longer, and the other departments, would be
swallowed up by the judiciary. By extending the judicial power to all cases in law
and equity, the constitution had never been understood to confer upon that department any political power whatever. To come within this description, a question
must assume a legal form for forensic litigation and judicial decision. There must
be parties to come into court, who can be reached by its process, and bound by itspower ;
whose rights admit of ultimate decision by a tribunal to which they are bound to
submit." 5 Wheat. Rep. Appendix.

This interpretation is unquestionable. Cases in law an& equity
within the meaning of the Constitution, therefore, are suits or proceedings in court requiring the exercise of judicial power. And as
this article of the Constitution refers to and has in view no courts
but the federal tribunals, it is manifest that the language "the cases in
law and equity arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States," comprehends only suits or proceedingsinstituted in
the federal courts, invoking the exercise of the judicial power of
the United States.

The Constitution does not say that the judicial

power shall extend to all questions arising under the Constitution,
laws and treaties of the United States.

The idea that the judicial

power of the United States extends to every question arising under
the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, is not

only an absurdity, but an impracticability.
The judicial power acts only when its operation is invoked; and
its action is invoked only by a case or suit instituted under its jurisdiction. It is not possible, therefore, for the judicial power to take
cognizance of any question, except where a suit or judicial proceeding has been instituted under its jurisdiction, calling it into operation.

A case, therefore, within the meaning of the Constitution,

and to which the judicial power of the United States extends, must
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be, first, a suit or judicial proceeding institutedunder the authority
of the federal constitution, invoking the action of the judicial power
of the United States; and, second, it must involve a question, or
relate to. a subject matter pertainiug to the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States, or involve one of the other elements
of federal jurisdiction, specified in the Constitution. Such would
be a case arising under the Constitution of the United States; and
to all such cases, and none others, is the judicial power of the United States extended.
There is, therefore, no foundation for the doctrine that the first
clause of the second section of this article of the Constitution confers an exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts over all questions arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States. And the very claim *to appellate jurisdiction in the Suprem'e Court of the United States from the State courts, over cases
involving these subjects, for" adjudication, is an admission that the
Statb courts may take cognizance of, and determine these questions,
and that the jurisdiction of the federal courts over them isnot
exclusive. So that it cannot be claimed that the language"of the
Constitution extending the judicial power of the United States to
all cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States, is exclusive.
It is insisted, however, that the State courts, as to these questions, are courts of inferior jurisdiction to the 'federal tribunals,
and that, therefore, appellate jurisdiction as to them from the State
courts, may be given to the federal courts. But, as has already
been shown, the appellatejurisdiction of the Supreme Court. of the
United States, is expressly defined by the second clause of this
second section, and plainly limited to the supervision of the
decisions of the inferior federal courts. And as there is no provision whatever in the constitution, giving the federal courts-appellate
jurisdiction over the State courts, it follows that, as to these cases,
to which the judicial power of the United States is extended, the
State courts exercise a jurisdiction, concurrent and not inferior to
that of the federal tribunals. And it is- inherent in the nature of
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concurrent jurisdiction, that the courts which exercise it are tribunals of co-ordinate and co-equal authority, andneither can control the determinations of the other by the exercise of appellate
power; but the adjudication of the court in which the jurisdiction
first attaches, is conclusive and final.. This is a fair deduction
from the provisions in both the State and the Federal Constitutions.
The jurisdiction of the State courts is admitted, and the judicial
power of the United States is extended to the enumerated cases,
but by no language which makes it exclusive. It follows that the
jurisdiction of each is coneurrent,and there is nothing in the constitntion giving either appellate control over the other. Appellate jurisdiction by either over the other, would be fundamentally
incompatible with the theory and structure of our system of
government.
As nothing can be found in the third article of the Constitution
which provides the organic law for the judicial system of the
United States, authorizing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction'by
the federal courts over the State courts, can it be pretended that
this extraordinary power can be derived from any other part of the
Constitution ? There is no provision in the succeeding fourth, fifth,
sixth and seventh articles, even remotely bearing upon it; nor -is
there anything in the second article which defines the powers Qf
the executive department, in any way relating to the subject. And
certainly there is nothing to be found among the enumerated powers
of Congress, in the first article, to warrant Congress in clothing the
federal courts with any such authority. The eighth section of
this article, containing the specific enumeration of the powers of
Congress, authorizes Congress to establish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court; but there is nothing empowering Congress to
authorize appeals from the State courts to the Supreme Court, or
to exercise any authority whatever over the State courts.- The
first clause of this section confers the power " to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for
the common defence and general welfare of the United States."
The authoriti here given to raise revenue with a view to pay debts
-
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and provide for the common defence and general welfare, clearly
contains no grant of judicial power. The 'most latitudinarian construction heretofore given to the constitution, has not conceded to
.Congress general discretionary power to pass laws providing for the
general welfare. On the contrary, it appears to be settled that this
authority of Congress to provide for the common defence and general welfare, has relation to the enumerated powers, and can be
exercised only pursuant to, and in the execution of the express
powers granted and specifically enumerated.
Where, then, is the authority in the constitution for this appellate.
power ? Can it be found among the implied powers of the government? The eighteenth clause of the eighth section, article 1,
empowers Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all
other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or officer thereof." This is
express authority for the exercise of the- incidental powers, and
having relation to the express powers, can only be exercised pursuant to them. It Authorizes the enactment of all laws "proper
and necessary" for the execution of the express powers vested in
the several departments of the government. Now, as the express
power giving the Supreme Court of the United States appellate
jurisdiction,is that which is contained in the third article of the
constitution, and has relation only to appeals from the inferior
federal tribunals, it follows that the incidental or implied power in
relation thereto, is limited to necessary and proper laws relating to
appeals from the inferior federal courts to the Supreme Court, and
nothing more.
The second clause of the sixth article of the constitution, declaring
the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, the supreme
law. of the land, has been urged in support of the alleged supremacy of the judicial power of the United States over the State
courts. This clause, however, is merely declaratory, and vests
no specific power whatever in the government, or any of its
departments. No one questions the supremacy of the constitu5
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tion, laws and treaties of the federal government. This supremacy
is not, however, absolute, and is limited to the sphere of the
delegated powers of the federal compact. And the State courts
are bound to observe this supremacy in all matters judicially
brought before them, as well as the federal courts. This supremacy,
therefore, imposes subjection to the constitution, laws and treaties
of the United States, but not subjection to the federal courts.
The constitution and statutes of each State is the supreme law of
the land within the sphere of the State authority; while the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, are the supreme
law of the land within their appropriate operation. But how can
this mere declaratory provision authorize appellate jurisdiction in
the federal courts over the State tribunals ? The very clause of
the constitution which contains it, requires that the judges of every
State shall be bound by the constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States, as the supreme law of the land, anything in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
And the succeeding clause of the same article requires of the judicial officers of the several States, together with other officers, an
official oath to support the Constitution of the United States.
Although the official oath of the federal officers requires the same
thing, yet, it does not enjoin upon them the duty of supporting
the constitution of the several states. Not only, therefore, is no
distrust in the State judiciary shown by the constitution, but the
fidelity required by the oath of office, implies that the determination
of matters pertaining to the federal constitution, laws, &c., might
occur in the State courts, as well as in the federal courts. And if
a revising or controlling power over the State courts, in this
respect, by the federal courts, had been contemplated, it would
undoubtedly have been expressly and distinctly delegated. But
this not having been done, the judicial officers of the several States
as well as the federal officers, are required, under the injunction of
an official oath, to observe and support the constitution, laws and
treaties of the United States, as the supreme law of the land.
The existence of appellate power in the Supreme Court of the
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United States over the State courts, has been argued from its
tendency to produce uniformity of decision, and prevent conflict
between the adjudications of the State and the federal tribunals.
This argument is founded on the supposed utility or beneficial
tendency of such a power. It is an argument in favor, rather of
the propriety and policy of the power, than of its existence; and
would be more appropriate on a political question before a convention or legislative assembly, than on a legal question before a court
of justice. The judicial question before us, is a mere question of
interpretation; and is to be determined from the language of theconstitution, by an application of the known and settled rules of'
judicial construction. The duty of judicial action does not go
beyond this. But it is to be lamented, that the political bearing
of questions of mere constitutional interpretation in our courts, has
been heretofore, a source of too frequent error in this country,
leading to determinations making the constitution by construction,
what the judges wish it to be, or what they think it ought to be,
rather than what it actually is.
The alledged salutary tendency of this appellate power for the
purpose of uniformity of decision, has been greatly exaggerated,
and made a mere pretence to justify the power in question. For
that uniformity is not in fact attained, or in eod faith attempted
by the 25th section of the judiciaryact of the Congress of 1789. That
act authorizes the appeal in cases, where the uniformity of decision
may exist, and denies it in cases where the uniformity may not
exist. It is only where the decision is in favor of the authority of
the State, or against the power of the federal government, that the
appeal is authorized. When, therefore the State court has decided
in favor of the validity of a State law, on the ground that it is not
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and the Supreme
Court of the United States, either, has already decided, or would
decide in favor of the validity of the law, there is uniformity of
decision, and yet, the appeal in such a case is allowed. On the
other hand, where the State court decides against the validity of a
State law, and the federal court, either, has already decided, or
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would decide in favor of the validity of the law, there is want of
uniformity; and yet, in that case, the appeal is denied. Uniformity
of decision, is, it would appear, a matter of no importance, providing
the decision of the State court be in favor of the authority of the
federal government. But where the State court decides to sustain
the validity of a State law, there the want of uniformity will justify
the federal court in reversing the judgment of the State court!
The enormity of this solicism is made even more glaring by the
fact, that the judges of the federal courts, are under no official
oath to support the constitutions of the several States, against the
authority of which, they are allowed to decide, while the judges of
the State courts are placed under the solemnity of that official
injunction, to support the constitution of the United States, as well
as that of their State. Yet notwithstanding this, the decision of the
court of last resort in a State, is, according to this law of Congress,
presumed to be right, and therefore final,if it be against the authority
of the State, and in favor of that of the United States, but if the decision be to the contrary, it is preiumed to be liable to error, and therefore, subject to revision and reversal in the federal court. This presents the monstrous absurdity in judicial action, of making the judgment of a court of justice final or not according to the party in whose
favor it may happen to have been rendered, of making a court, the
court of last resort or not in the determination of a cause, according
as it may be decided in favor of one or the other of the parties.
This novel and extraordinary feature in the judicial system of the
United States, is founded on a want of confidence in the integrity
and fidelity of the State courts, and only admits that they are to
be trusted as impartial,when they decide in a particular way, in
other words, in favor of the power of the general government.
The manifest effect of this incongruity, is to aggrandize the federal
government at the expense of the degradation of that of the several
States.
Upon no ground whatever can uniformity of decision be urged
as an argument in favor of the existence of this appellate power.
The courts of this country are prone to follow precedents, and
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sometimes, even go too far, for the sake of uniformity of decision.
Notwithstanding this, there is often as much want of uniformity in
the various decisions of the same court, as is to be found between
the decisions of the courts of the different States, or between the
decisions of the State and the Federal -courts.
And there can be no conflict of authority between courts of
concurrent jurisdiction, as it is settled that,. as between courts of
concurrent jurisdiction, the adjudication of the court in which the
jurisdiction first attaches, is final and conclusive upon the parties.
And in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction in different courts, the
plaintiff selects the tribunal in which to bring his suit; and having
selected his tribunal, he should abide by the decision. 'Nor has the
defendant any right to complain in such case, and have another
trial in the federal courts, when the decision of the State court is
against him. Whether he be a citizen, or mere non-resident or sojourner in the State, he is bound to acquiesce in the decisions of its
tribunals, having subjected himself to this liability by voluntarily
putting himself under the protection of its laws.
It has been argued in favor of this appellate power, that appeals
were allowed from the State courts to the courts established by
Congress, under the Articles of Confederation of 1778, an instrument which, as it has been said, encroached far less on the sovereignty of the States than the present constitution. The foundation of this, as an argument drawn from analogy, when accurately
understood, is in reality against,instead of being in favor of the
existence of this power under the present constitution. The only
provision in relation to the exercise of judicial power, contained in
the, Articles of Confederation, is the following, in article ninth:
"The United States, in Congress assembled,, shall have the sole"
and exclusive right and power of appointing courts for thie trial of
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and establishing
courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of
captures." . The judicial power here given, over piracies and felonies upon the high seas, is "sole and exclusive." So also, is the power
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of establishing appellate courts of dernier resort for the final determination of all cases of captures "sole and exclusive." Some such language as this would have been used in the Constitution of the United
States, had it been the intention to give to the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over, or the exclusive final determination of, the various
cases to which the judicial power of the United States was extended.
This provision, however, in the Articles of Confederation, affords
no ground for argument founded on precedent or analogy, in favor
of this appellate power over the State courts. The relation of the
States to the authorities under the confederation, was essentially
different from that of the States to the federal government. Under
the Constitution of the United States, the federal government is a
distinct and independent government, to which the several States
stand in the relation of distinct, equal, and co-ordinate powers.
But the confederation did not, in reality, possess the essential
elements of a distinct government. The only distinct branch of
government established by it was the Congress, and that was greatly
dependent on the States. The confederation was a mere alliance
of the States for common defence, and certain general regulations
respecting their foreign relations, commercial affairs, &c. It was
not a distinct government, in and of itself, but a mere agency of
the States, exercising their confederated authority. No distinct
judicial system was, in fact, established by the confederation; no
superior and subordinate courts authorized, and no distribution of
jurisdiction provided for. So that, no precedent or analogy whatever is to be found here, for this supervisory control over the State
courts.
It has been said that this appellate power of the Supreme Court
of the United States is sustained by contemporaneous construction
of the constitution. This is, however, chiefly founded on the opinion
expressed in the political work entitled "The Federalist," consisting
of a series of articles written by Messrs. Hamilton, Madison, and
Jay, over the signature of ""Publius." While this work is not
entitled to the weight of judicial authority, it is liable to the further
objection that it was a newspaper publication, written in the haste
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and excitement of a political contest. And although the authors
were gentlemen eminently'distinguished for ability and patriotism,.
yet they took part with the political party which in the constitutional
convention insisted on an enlargement of the powers of the federal
government beyond that which was conceded by the convention in
the formation of the constitution. It is a historical fact that the
convention which formed the Constitution of the United States was
to a considerable extent divided into two parties, one of which
insisted on the establishment of a national government, with an
absolute negative on the power of the State governments, while the
other insisted on a strictlyfederal government, reserving and securing to the several States their freedom and sovereignty as distinct,
equal and co-ordinate governments. On the one side it was urged
that the danger to be apprehended was, that the reserved powers
of the States would combine and destroy the efficiency of the delegated power; and on the other side, it was strenuously insisted that
the danger to be feared Wks that the delegated powers of the general government would absorb the reserved powers of the States and
result in a consolidated government destructive to the sovereignty of
the States, and dangerous to the freedom of the people. This
division of opinion was manifested in the proceedings of the convention throughout its deliberations, and produced much solicitude
and excitement among the people of the several States. Those in
the convention in favor of a national government were found in the
minority; and although they yielded in the convention, and ably
advocated the adoption of the constitution, they did not abandon
their political views, but sought still to carry them out to some
extent by enlarging the powers of the general government by a very
liberal, and in some instances a latitudinarian construction of the
constitution. The authors of the "Federalist," acting with the party
which insisted on giving the greatest strength and energy to the
general government, placed that construction on the constitution
which tended most to enlarge its powers. It is true, Mr. Madison
afterwards somewhat changed his course, united with Mr. Jefferson
and his friends, and for a time adopted the strict construction of
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the constitution, as appears from his report and resolutions in the
legislature of Virginia, in January, 1800.
The articles in the "Federalist," therefore, should be received
with many grains of allowance on account of their partizan character.
And written in the heat of a political contest, it is not surprising
that they are not in all their parts, perfectly consistent.
It is true, that the 82d number of the articles in this work, and
which was written by Mr. Hamilton, expresses the opinion that
"the national and the State (judicial) systems are to be regarded
as ONE WHOLE ;" and that an appeal lies not only from the State
courts to the Supreme Court of the United States, but on the last
page of this article he adds, "Ipereiveat present no impediment
to the establishmentof an appeal from the State courts to the subordinatenationaltribunals, and many advantagesattending the power
of doing it may be imagined !" This opinion as expressed is not
deduced from a close and satisfactory analysis or interpretation of
the language of the constitution. Andif it be followed, Congress
would have the power, and may, whenever that body deems it proper,
make the judgments of the highest courts in the several States
subject to revision and reversal in the United States District Court,
which is held by a single judge, or in any of the other subordinate
courts of the United States. If the doctrine of this work is to be
adopted in the construction of the constitution, Congress may pass
a law authorizing appeals from any of the courts of a State, even
from justices of the peace, to any of the federal tribunals; and the
judgments of the Supreme Court or of any of the other courts of a.
State may be made subject to revision and reversal in any of the
subordinate federal tribunals, even in that of a mere commissioner
under the federal judiciary, now in the exercise of judicial power,
notwithstanding he is not appointed by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. If this doctrine be tenable, the constitution
has provided no safeguard whatever for the independence and sovereignty of the States.
In the 81st article of the " Federalist," Mr. Hamilton expresses the
opinion, that Congress may confer jurisdiction on the State courts
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to try causes arising out of the federal constitution, and adds, in
his own words: " To confer upon the existing courts of the several
States the power of determining such causes would Perhaps be as
much 'to constitute tribunals' as to create new courts with the like
power," &c. How is this to be reconciled with the first section of
the third article of the constitution, containing the positive provision
that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish, the judges of which courts
shall hold their offices during good behavior, and at stated times
receive for their services a compensation from the United States
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office?
Are not the judges of the inferior courts, in whom the judicial
power of the United States is authorized to be vested, federal courts
exclusively? By whom are they to be appointed? From what
source are they to receive their salaries ? And can their compensation be diminished during their term of office?
As a further instance to show the liberal construction given by
Mr. Hamilton to the constitution, it may be added that in his report
as Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, of December
5th, 1791, he expressly contends that it belongs to the discretion of
Congress to pronounce upon the objects which concern the general
welfare, for which an appropriation of money may be made; and
in his own words says, "there seems to be no room for a doubt, that
whatever concerns the general interests of learning, of agriculture,
of manufactures, and of commerce, are within the sphere of the
national councils, as far as regards an appropriation of money."
Such a construction, once conceded, would result in a consolidation
of all the controlling civil power and influence in the general government, and a total annihilation of the sovereignty and freedom of
the States.
Yet on the fifth j age of the 45th article in the "Federalist," the
following language is used by Mr. Madison:
"The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government,
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are nume-
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rous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties and properties of the Reople; and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State." . . . . "If the new constitution be examined with
accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change which it proposes, consists
much less in the addition of newpowers to the Union, than in the invigoration of its
original powers."

Many pages might be occupied in presenting the conflicting and
irreconcilable opinions and speculations of the distinguished authors
of this political publication. But more attention has already been
given to it than would have been deemed necessary, but for the fact,
that it has been greatly relied on as authority, on the subject under
consideration, even in the reported opinions of the Supreme Court
of the United States.
In further support of this alleged contemporaneous construction
of the constitution, the opinion of the first Congress which assembled, and by which the judiciary act of 1789 was passed, providing
for this appellate power, is sometimes referred to. This is also an
authority novel in its character. The very question involved, is
that of the constitutionality of the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary ct, providing for the exercise of this appellate power. And
is this to be determined by the opinion of the legislative body which
enacted the law ? If this be good authority, every unconstitutional
law can sustain itself; for the law itself is an authoritative exposition of the opinion of the august body by which it was enacted.
By such authority, the constitutionality of the alien and sedition
laws could be sustained, -which vested arbitrary and despotic power
in the President of -the United States, and abridged the freedom of
speech and of the press, in plain violation of the constitution ; and
also the constitutionality of the numerous other acts which have been
repealed, and are now repudiated by the force of public sentiment
as wholly unwarranted by the constitution.

STUNT vs. THE STEAMBOAT OHIO.

But it is said that, as the Congress which enacted the Judiciary
Act of 1789, was composed ot a number of eminent men, who were
prominent members of the convention which formed the constitution, the legislative construction thus given to the constitution is
entitled to great consideration. This reasoning is in conflict with
the principle which has been deemed of vital importance in all free
governments, by enlightened writers, including the authors of the
"Federalist," that the power of making and the power of expounding a law or constitution should not be given to the same persons.
No one will deny that the illustrious men who took a leading part
in forming our government, are entitled to great credit for ability
and patriotism. But it would be a manifestation of imbecility in
their descendants, to attribute to them the perfection of wisdom, and
an exemption from the ordinary infirmities of humanity. In the
establishment of our government, they made an experiment in the
science of government, new in theory, and vast and complicated in
its operations. They made no pretension themselves that it was
perfect, or that they could foregee all the dangers or imperfections
incident to its operation, and which time and experience alone could
fully make known. Mr. Madison, in the 38th Article in the
"Federalist," uses the following language :-1" Is it unreasonable
to conjecture, that the errors which may be contained in the plan
of the convention, are such as have resulted, rather from defect of
antecedent experience on this complicated and difficult subject, than
from the want of accuracy or care in the investigation of it, and
consequently, that they are such as will not be ascertained until an
actual trial will point them out ? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by many considerations of a general nature, but by
the particular care of the Articles of Confederation. It is observable, that among the numerous objections and amendments suggested
by the several States, when these Articles were under consideration,
not one is found which alludes to the great and radical error, which
on trial has discovered itself !"
The justness of these remarks is fully illustrated by the practical
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operation of the system under the constitution, which has fully demonstrated that the opinion of those eminent men who formed the constitution, (and which doubtless led to the adoption of' the 25th section
of the Judiciary Act,) that the powers of the general government
would prove too weak to resist the influence of the State governments, was groundless; and that, on the contrary, the weak point
in the system is now fully shown to consist in the concentration of
power and influence in the federal government, tending rapidly to
absorb the entire sovereignty of the States.
I concede to the fullest extent, that high respect and deference
for the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States justly
and properly due, from a consideration, not only of the position of
that tribunal, but also of the eminent intellectual and moral qualities
which have distinguished its incumbents. But timid submission to
the exercise of extraordinary civil power, without even an inquiry
into the reason or authority for its assumption, is not required
by the high consideration due that court, nor is it a peculiarity
of the age or country in which we live. It is not to be expected,
in case of conflict between the authorities of the federal and the
State governments, that the decision of the federal tribunal is to be
above the reach of respectful examination, even by the authorities
of the co-ordinate power. The sentiment which would exact such
submission, may be becoming under the exercise of despotic power,
where an inquiry into its reason or authority is not allowed, but it
is not suited to the temper and characteristics of a free people.
It is said, that this appellate power of the Supreme Court of the
United States has been exercis d for many years, and sustained by
repeated adjudications. If unauthorized, it is a sufficient answer to
this, that the usurpation of civil powe:', in this country, never becomes constitutional or legal by prescription, or frequent repetition. And although the federal court has decided in favor of its
own assumptions of power over the State courts, its decisions have
not been universally acquiesced in; on the contrary, some of the
States have not only absolutely refused submission, but successfully
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resisted its power. In the case of Bunter against Martin, devisee
of Fairfax, in which the validity of a treaty of the United States
was drawn into question, the Supreme Court of Appeals of the
State of Virginia unanimously refused obedience to a mandate from
the Supreme Court of the United States, holding that the 25th
section of the Judiciary Act was unconstitutional, that the
appellate power of the Suprdme Court of the United States could
not be extended to the proceedings of the State courts, and that
the proceedings of the federal court in that case, purporting to reverse the judgment of the State court, were coram non
judice. It appears from the report of this case, in 4 Mumford's
Rep., p. 1, that the subject was thoroughly investigated on the
hearing, and an elaborate opinion from each member of the court
is given, maintaining the position taken, by arguments remarkable
for ability, and the dignified and dispassionate view taken of the
whole subject.
The case of Vorcester vs. Te State of Georgia, 6 Peters,
515, was a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United
States to the Superior Court of Gwinnett county, to reverse the
judgment of the State court, under which Worcester had been convicted and sentenced to the peniteAtiary for the violation of the
criminal provisions of a -statute of Georgia, in relation to white persons residing within the Cherokee nation of Indians, without permission and conformity to the laws of the State. The Supreme
Court of the United States, in 1832, gave judgment reversing and
annulling the judgment of the State court, and directing a special
mandate to be sent to the State court, to carry the judgment of
reversal into execution.
And in the case of Butler vs. The State of Georgia, which was
a case of the same kind, the Supreme Court of the United States
rendered the same kind of a judgment, and made the same kind of
an order as that made in the case of Worcester, 6 Peters, 597.
It appears, however, that on the receipt of the mandate in each
of these cases, the authorities of the State of Georgia treated them
as matters of no validity, wholly disregarded them, and not only

STUNT vs. THE STEAMBOAT OHIO.

kept Worcester and Butler in the penitentiary, in defiance of the
orders of the Supreme Court of the United States, but also continued to execute the State law under which they were convicted.
Two other cases occurred in Georgia, of even a more serious
character: one, the case of Tassels, in 1830, and the other, the
case of Graves, in 1834. Each of these persons having been convicted under the criminal laws of the State, and sentenced to the
punishment of death, the Supreme Court of the United States in
each case, on the application of the defendant, had allowed a writ
of error to the State court; but the State authorities, in each case,
treated the proceedings in the federal court with contempt, and executed the sentence of the State court by hanging the defendants.
But the matter was not allowed to stop here. In reference to the
case of Tassels, the legislature of the State of Georgia, in 1830,
adopted, among others, the following Resolutions:
"Besolved, That the State of Georgia will never so far compromit her sovereignty as an independent State, as to become a party
to the case sought to be made before the Supreme Court of the
United States, by the writ in question.
"Resolved, That his excellency, the governor, be, and he and
every other 6fficer of this State, is hereby requested and enjoined
to disregard any and every mandate and process that has been, or
shall be served on him or them, purporting to proceed from the
chief justice, or any associate justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, for the purpose of arresting the execution of
any of the criminal laws of this State."
Resolutions were also passed by the Legislature of that State, to
the same effect, in reference to the case of Graves, in 1834.
It is understood that the States of Virginia and Georgia have
ever refused to recognize, or acquiesce in, the exercise of this power
by the Supreme Court of the United States. And in the recent case
of Padelford,Pay J.Co. vs. The City of Savannah, decided in the
Supreme Court of Georgia, 14 Georgia, 440, an elaborate
opinion is given, exposing and condemning in strong and severe
terms, this unwarranted exercise of power by the Supreme Court of
the United States.
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In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Cobbet, 8 Dallas' Rep.,
467, the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania, by a solemn
adjudication, unanimously refused to submit to the, control of the
federal judiciary over the State courts, provided for in the judiciary act of 1789, on the ground of its unconstitutionality. And in
this case, Chief Justice IM'Kean, very fully expressed the opinion
af the court against the interpretation of the constitution by which
this appellate power is claimed.
I am not informed of a single instance, in which the question has
been fairly made in the Supreme Court of a State, where this
power claimed for the Supreme Court of the United States has
been approved, although it has been reluctantly submitted to, in a
number of instances.
It may well be claimed, therefore, that this doctrine of the
Supreme.Court of the United States is not of unquestionable, nor
of unquestioned authority. On the contrary, it appears, that since
its first assumption, although" it may have been submitted to, in a
number of instances, without the question being made, yet it has
been always questioned in some of the States, and not only denied
in their courts, but in some cases successfully resisted.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in
favor of its own assumptions of power, and the enlargement of tho
powers of the general government, have not been satisfactory, and
have greatly detracted from the weight, which would have been
otherwise conceded to the opinions of that tribunal. The federal
courts, at first, even assumed jurisdiction of crimes at common
law. 2 Dallas's Rep. 297, 384. This jurisdiction, was afterwards
abandoned, and is now conceded to have, been an unauthorized
exercise-of power. And it is a remarkable fact, that almost, every
unwarranted stretch of power by Congress, has been sustained by
the Supreme Court of the United States. This is a matter of
public history. The alien and sedition laws; the vexatious regulations of the embargo and non-intercourse acts ; the act to incorporate
a bank of the United States, (passed in the exercise of a power,
not only not found in the constitution, but which the convention
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which framed the Constitution of the United States, by a distinct
vote, positively refused to delegate); the recent bankrupt law,
(which, by its retro-active operation, invaded the rights of private
property, and to an alarming extent, impaired the obligations of
actual contracts, made on the faith reposed in the integrity of the
government, and on the terms of existing laws;) these, and numerous other acts, which might be mentioned, now repealed, and
wholly repudiated by the force of public sentiment, as unwarranted
by the constitution, received a ready sanction in the Supreme
Court of the United States. In view of the unmistakable disposition manifested by that tribunal, to'enlarge the powers-of the
general government by construction; in view of the fact, that it has
taken under its protection almost every species of corporations, political, pecuniary, and eleemosynary; in view of its repeated encroahments on the sovereignty of the States, by annulling laws which, in
no way whatever, concerned the affairs of the federal government, or
interfered with the progress of its legitimate administration, it
must be admitted, although much to be lamented, that the decisions
of that tribunal have not only lost much of their*moral influence,
but much weight as judicial authority in the Courts ofthe States.
In asserting this appellate power over the State courts, the
Supreme Court of the United States has not deduced it from the
constitution by any clear and satisfactory interpretation.
The
cases in which the Court has attempted to defend this power by
argument, are Martin vs. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, and Cohens vs.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 413. In the first, the opinion of the Court is
by Mr. Justice Story, in the latter, by Chief Justice Marshall. In
both these opinions, the -second clause of the second section of the
third article of the constitution, which contains the clause providing
for the appellate power of the Supreme Court, is separated from its
connection with the other paits of its subject matter, and taken
abstractly, is declared to give appellate power in general terms,
without any reference whatever to the inferior courts over which it
shall be exercised. This, as I have already shown, is an unfair and
unwarrantable mode of construing the constitution. Taken in its
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proper connection, the appellate power here given has a clear and
undoubted reference and application to the inferior federal courts
mentioned and authorized as a part of the same judicial system.
Again, remarkable as it may seem in both these opinions, the
first clause of this second section, which provides that "the judicial
power of the United States shall extenc[ to all cases in law and
equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties," &c., is relied on to sustain this appellate power. I
have already shown that this provision clearly confers neither
appellate nor exclusive jurisdiction.
In the case of Martin vs. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 340, the Supreme
Court of the United States concedes the fact, that the language of
constitution extending the judicial power to "all cases" arising out
of the enumerated subjects, does not confer exclusive jurisdiction
touching these matters. But Mr. Justice Story says, that, as the State
courts will exercise concurrent jurisdiction over many of these
enumerated subjects, if no appeal can be taken from the State
courts to the federal courts, the judicial power of the United
States will extend only to some, and not all such cases! This is
certainly an unsatisfactory mode-of reasoning. If even the right of
appeal from the State courts to the federal courts existed, it would
frequently happen that an appeal would not be taken from the
adjudication in the State court. In such case, could it be pretended that the constitutional exercise of the judicial power of the
United States was defeated ? Certainly not. It may be said, however, that the failing party had the option to appeal, and bring his
case within the judicial power of the United States. But if this
extension of the judicial power of the United States to all eases,
&c., is answered by leaving it to the option of one of the parties
to bring the case within the exercise of it, the option of the party
instituting the suit to bring it in the federal courts, is all sufficient.
This would be extending the judicial power of the United States to
all the enumerated cases in accordance with the constitution, which
can mean nothing more than authority to exercise jurisdiction over
any of the specified cases, whenever a party shall elect to institute
a suit in the federal courts touching the same.
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In both these opinions, the federal court has manifested great
sensitiveness and jealousy in regard to the concurrent jurisdiction
of the State courts. The leading consideration in the strained
construction given to the constitution by the federal court, appears
to be founded on the supposed abuse of power by the State courts.
It seems to be taken for granted that the State courts are not to
be trusted, and will be unfaithful to the Constitution of the United
States, notwithstanding the judges are sworn to support it. And
Judge Story, in .Jfartin vs. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 348, said that
"mischiefs truly deplorable" would exist, if the federal court did
not exercise a supervisory control over the State tribunals. And
in the case of Cohens vs. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, Chief Justice
Marshall said, " it would be hazarding too nuch to assert that the
judicatures of the States will be exempt from the prejudices by
which the Legislatures and people are influenced, and will constitute pesfectly impartialtribunals."
The anticipated abuse of power by the States, and the supposed
disregard of the constitution and laws of the United States, by the
State courts, is made the pretext for the assumption of this appelate power over the State courts. In both the opinions of the
Supreme Court of the United States mentioned, the burden of the
argument is, that this supervisory power is reasonable,proper, and
highly necessary. The necessity and utility of the power has ever
been the tyrant's plea for the usurpation of power. This argument
founded on the utility and necessity of the power, would have been
legitimate in the convention which formed the constitution, or on a
proposition to amend the constitution, but in giving a construction
to the constitution, it is entitled to no consideration whatever, if the
power be not fairly and clearly deducible from the language of the
instrument.
In both of these opinions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the "Federalist" is relied on as very high authority. And
here the remark is not inappropriate, that one of the leading points
decided in the case of Cohens vs. Virginia, was, that this appellate
jurisdiction could be exercised against a State as a party defendant.
On this point, however, the authority of the "Federalist" is in
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direct conflict with the decision of the court, as appears by the
following extract from the 81st article of that work.
"It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice
of mankind, and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a
surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the
"The
.....
States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal." ...
contracts between a nation and individuals, are only binding on the conscience of
the sovereign, and have no pretension to a compulsive force. They confer no right
of action independent of the sovereign will. To what purpose would it be, to authorize suits against States for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced?
It is evident it could not be done, without waging war against the contracting State,,
and to ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication, and in destructionof apre-exist-.
ing right of the State governments, a yowerwhiclh would involve such a consequence, would'
be altogetherforcedand UNWARRANTAnLE."

Although the Federalist is cited as reliable authority to sustaih
the appellate power of the Supreme Court of the United States over
the State courts, yet the opinion expressed in this work, that a State is
not amenable to a suit brought against it in the federal courts, is
wholly repudiated. And as early as the case of Chisholm vs. ceorgia, 2 Dallas, 474, the Supreme Court of the United States, held,
that the judicial power of the United States extended to a suit
against a State, since which it has been no rare occurence for a
State to be arraigned before the bar of the Supreme Court of the
United States. And inasmuch as Judge Story, in a note in his
Commentaries on the Constitution, vol. 3, p. 548, not only repudiates
the doctrine of Mr. Hamilton above recited in the 81st article of
the Federalist, as irreconcilable with the reasoning of the next preceding article of the same work; but also, on page 546, of his Commentaries, copies extensively from this preceding article in the Federalist, to sustain the opposite opinion, I will take the liberty of
sustaining the doctrine of the Federalist in article 81, above recited, by
an authority entitled to very great respect. In the convention of
Virginia, on the occasion of the ratification of the Constitution of
the United States, John Marshall, (afterwards Chief Justice) in a
speech in the convention, said :
"I hope no gentleman will think that a State will be called at the bar of the fed-eral court. Is there no such case atpresent? Are there not many cases, in which
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the legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the State is not sued? It is not rational to suppose, that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a Court. The
intent is, to enable States to recover claims of individuals residing in other States.
I contend this construction is warranted by the words. But, say they, there will be
partiality in it, if a State cannot be defendant, if an individual cannot proceed to
obtain judgment against a State, though he may be sued by a State. Itis necessary
to be so, and cannot be avoided." Elliott's Debates, vol. 2, page 405.

It would appear, therefore, that the "Federalist" is not only not
always consistent with itself, but not always consistent with the doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States; that Chief
Justice Marshall announced a doctrine from the bench, the very
opposite of that which he had previously declared in the convention
of Virginia, when urging the adoption of the Constitution; and
that Mr. Justice Story, while he adopted the doctrine of one article in the "Federalist" as high authority, repudiated that of the
next succeeding article, as irreconcilable with the part of the
work which he had adopted! The opinions of these great, and no
doubt, good men, entangled with plain inconsistencies and confounded by conflict, constitute the chief weight of authority to sustain the supervisory power of the Supreme Court of the United
States over the State courts. It is true, that the Commentaries of
Chancellor Kent, and also the works of some other highly respectable elementary writers, are sometimes referred to as sustaining this
appellate power. But it is to be remarked, that none of these writers have entered into any investigation of the subject themselves.
They simply give the opinions declared by the Supreme Court of
the United States, and that found in the "Federalist," on which
the whole doctrine appears to rest.
The admitted fact that the Supreme Court of the United States
cannot control the action of the State courts by supercedeas, procedendo, or mandamuas, furnishes a most conclusive argument
against the right to the appellate jurisdiction in question. Such
power of control over subordinate courts is essential to the complete and proper exercise of the appellate power.
The twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of 1789 provides
only for its exercise in cases where the record of the State court
discloses the fact that questions arose connected with some of the
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enumerated subjects of the federal jurisdiction. And the Supreme
Court of the United States have, in numerous cases, adjudged that
it was essential to the exercise of this appellate power over the
State courts, that the record of the State court should explicitly
show the following indispensable requisites, to wit: First, that a
question arose in the State court involving some one of the specified subjects of the judicial power of the United States. Second,
that a decision was actually made on the question in the State
court, in the way pointed out in Act of Congress. Third, that the
decision became necessary in the determination of the case. And
if each one of these requisites do not appear by the record, it is
held, that the jurisdiction fails. Crowell vs. 1andall,10 Pet. 368;
Commercial Bank of Cincinnativs. Buckinghiam's .Ez'rs, 5 Howard, 341.
Now, it is unquestionable that the State courts have ample and
complete control over the records of their own proceedings; and
may, in most cases, successfully defeat this appellate power, by
causing their records to be so made up as not to show that any
such questions arose, or were decided. And it is undeniable that
each State has the power even to prohibit the allowance of a copy
of the record of any of its judicial proceedings, for the exercise of
this appellate jurisdiction by the federal courts. And the Supreme
Court of the United States being clothed with no power by mandamus or otherwise, either to control the form of the record in the
State court, or to compel the furnishing of an exemplification, this
appellate power must be wholly dependent on the discretion of the
State, and the action of the State court. The exercise of such appellate
power, dependent in a great measure on the option of the subordinate court and wholly on the acquiescence of the State government, and to which, although some of the States will submit, yet,
to which other States will absolutely refuse submission, will lead to
more conflict, difficulty, uncertainty and disturbance of harmony in
the administration of justice, than can be countervailed by any supposed benefit which can ever arise from it.
To sustain the supervising control of the federal courts over the
State courts it is asserted that the government of the United States
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is a national instead of a federal government; and that the judicial
powers of the general and the State governments are blended
together as parts of the same judicial system. Mr. Hamilton in the
82d article of the Federalist, said, "Agreeably to the remark already
made, the nationaland the State systems are to be regarded as oNE
wiior.
The courts of the latter will of course be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of the Union, and an appeal
from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal which is destined to
unite and assimilate the principles of natural justice and the rules
of national decision !" The ground of the appeal insisted upon
here is not any express provision in the constitution, but that the
government of the United States is national in its character, the
State courts mere auxiliaries of the courts of the United States,
and -the national and the State judicial systems to be regarded as
parts of one and the same system, or in the language of Mr. Hamilton, "as one whole." This doctrine is not merely quoted by Chief
Justice Marshall, in the case of Coheng vs. 7irginia,with marked
approbation, but adopted as the true exposition of the theory and
basis of our government. And in the case of Afartin vs. Hiunter's
Lessee, I Wheat. 323, Mr. Justice Story not only adopted the same
doctrine,- but enlarging and amplifying on it; said, "The Constitution
of the United States was ordained and established, not by the States
in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of
the Constitution declares, by 'the people of t]he United States.'
There can be no doubt that it was competent to the people to invest
the general government with all the powers which they might deem
proper and necessary, to extend or restrain these powers according
to their own good pleasure, and to give them a paramount and
supreme authority."
This is the only ground which gives plausibility even to the claim
or a supervising power in the Supreme Court of the United States
over the State courts. Ifthe government of the United States be
a national government, and the States subordinate departments, if
the judiciary of the United States and that of the several States
are blended, belong to one and the same system, are but parts of
"4one whole," deriving their powers from the same source, and

STUNT vs. THE STEAMBOAT OHIO.

responsible to the same authority, then it may be admitted that
there is force in the argument in favor of this appellate power.
But if on the other hand the government of the United States be a
federal government of limited and defined powers, and the States
distinct, independent sovereignties within the appropriate sphere of
their powers ; if the judiciary of the United States and that of the
several States are separate and distinct from each other, belonging
to independent and distinct judicial systems, each distinct and
different in its organization from the other, deriving its power from
a different source, and responsible to a different authority, then this
appellate power claimed for the Supreme Court of the United States
is wholly inconsistent with the theory and structure of our government.
This distinction is a most important one in the determination of
the question under consideration. As has already'been remarked,
appellate, jurisdiction comprehends the relation of superior and
subordinate tribunals. And if this appellate power over the State
courts be delegated by the Constitution, Congress has the authority
to provide all the necessary and proper remedies to carry it into
full and complete execution. For the full exercise of the powers
of an appellate court, there must be not only the power of reversing
the judgment of the subordinate court, but the necessary control
over its action. The appellate court must have the power by supercedeas to suspend the action of the subordinate tribunal, pending an
appeal or writ of error; the power by mandate to require its judgments of reversal to be entered in the subordinate court, and the
power by procedendo to compel the subordinate court to proceed in
the exercise of its authority under the direction of the revising
power. And the very fact of the relation of superior and subordinate tribunals in the exercise of the same judicial power, furnishes
just foundation for giving the superior court the further controlling
power of the writ of mandamus and also the writ of prohibition.
And if Congress can give the Supreme Court of the United States
supervising power over the State courts, it can confer the same
power on the Circuit, the District, and other inferior federal courts.
The one is derived from a construction which most indubitably
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sustains the other. The Constitution, although it prescribes the
line of distinction between the original and appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, leaves the distribution of the jurisdiction of the
inferior federal courts to the discretion of Congress. And if the
relations of the general and the State governments be such that a
supervising power can be given by Congress over the courts of the
latter to the Supreme Court of the United States, it follows that by
the exercise of the same power it can be given to the inferior federal
tribunals in regulating their appellate jurisdiction. So that, if Mr.
Hamilton's proposition in relation to the appellate power of the
Supreme Court be correct, his opinion above referred to in the
Federalist, in relation to the appellate power which might be given
to the inferior federal courts over the State courts follows as a
legitimate deduction. And in the case of &Zartinvs. Hunter, above
cited, in 1 Wheat., on page 349, Mr. Justice Story, in defending the
provision of the 12th section of the United States Judiciary Act of
1789, for the removal of a suit before trial from the State courts to
the Circuit Court of the United States, distinctly said, that this is
the exercise of appellate and not of original jurisdiction. And on
page 350, he adds, "And if the appellate power by the Constitution
does not include cases pending in the State courts, the right of removal, which is but a mode of exercising that power, cannot be
applied to them." The same doctrine is adopted and repeated by
the learned jurist, in the 3d Vol. of his Commentaries on the Constitution, pages 609 and 610. This proceeding of the federal
judiciary gives a new feature to appellate jurisdiction, heretofore
understood as importing the power of retrying or revising the proceedings or decisions of a subordinate court in which judicial action
had actually taken place. Under this provision of the judiciary act,
the cause is required to be transferred to the federal court before
there has been any decision or any action whatever taken by the
State court. And this, Mr. Justice Story called appellatejurisdiction, and said that the right of removal cannot be exercised unless
it be by appellatejurisdiction. Yet the learned commentator, in the
3d Vol. of his Commentaries on the Constitution on page 627, said:
"Inreference to judicial tribunals, an appellate jurisdiction, therefore, necesarily
implies, that the subject matter has been already instituted in, and acted upon by
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some other court, whose judgment or proceedings are to be revised. This appellate
jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and indeed in any form which
the legislature may choose to prescribe; but still, the substance must exist, before
the form can be applied to it. To operate at all, then, under the constitution of
the United States, it is not sufficient that there has been a decision by some officer, or
department of the United States; it must be by one clothed with judicial authority,
and acting in a judicial capacity."

This doctrine in relation to the foundation for the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction will be universally recognized as correct, and
how it is to be reconciled with the proceeding under the 12th section of the judiciary act, for the removal of a cause from a State
court after its jurisdiction has legally and constitutionally attached,
but before any judicial action has been taken in the case, is left for
others to say, presuming it to be one of the instances in which
extraordinary power requires extraordinary reasons to sustain it.
It appears, therefore, according to the doctrine of Mr. Justice
Story, that the appellate jurisdiction of the subordinate federal
courts over the State courts, has been already, in one form, actually
provided for. If the federal courts can exercise a revising power
over the State courts, in cases where the jurisdiction of the State
tribunals is fully admitted, it must result from the subordination of
the State courts to the federal tribunals, and because the government of the United States, and that of the several States, are not
equal and co-ordinate governments, but because the government of
the United States is national in its form, and the States but subordinate parts of one consolidated system.
Appellate jurisdiction is not only a continuation of the exercise
of the same judicial power which has been executed in the court of
originaljurisdiction, bui it necessarily implies that the original and
appellate courts are capable of participating in the exercise of the
same judicial power. After the exercise of the appellate power in
the adjudication of a cause, important judicial acts often remain to
be done in the court of original jurisdiction. The entry of the
judgment in the subordinate court, is essential; otherwise the judgment on the records of that court appearing in full force, would entitle
the party to the process of the court to enforce it; and in such case,
if process be issued on the judgment in the appellate court, a con-
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flict would arise between the ministerial officers of the two coarts,
each protected by judicial process. But further, the subordinate
court has more to do than simply enter the judgment of the appellate court; it must conform its action to it, and carry it into full
effect. It is frequently necessary in the proper exercise of the
revising power, that the appellate court simply settle some general
principles or preliminary questions which govern a case, and remand
it to the subordinate court with a procedendo, thus directing and
controlling the action of the court of original jurisdiction, in the
further investigation and adjudication of the case. In the case
before us, suppose we should allow this motion and the Supreme
Court of the United States should reverse our judgment, the mandate of that court to us would require us to enter upon our records,
a judgment not our own, but a judgment pronounced by that court,
contrary to our own judgment in the case, and which we would be
commanded to carry into effect. If we should comply with the
mandate by entering the judgment of reversal, and conforming our
action to it, and carry it into full effect, we would perform either a
ministerial or a judicial act. It would scarcely be pretended by
any to be the former. There is certainly no authority for the
federal court to require the performance of ministerial or executive
duties by this court. Ministerial or executive duties under a
department of the general government, are performed by ministerial
or executive officers appointed and acting under the authority of
the constitution and laws of the United States. As it could not be
a ministerial,it must be a judicial act, which we would be directed
to perform. Every judicial act necessarily requires the exercise of
judicialpower. In the performance of this act, would we exercise
the judicial power of the United States or the judicial power of
the State of Ohio ? It could not be the judicial power of the State.
That has been fully and finally exercised in the case, by the judgment which we have already rendered. A final judgment in this
court expends or exhausts its judicial power as to that case ; and
unless brought up again upon some motion or proceeding known to
the laws of the State or some action by the Supreme Court of
Ohio, the judicial power of the State must there finally terminate.
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And it -willnot be pretended that there is anything'in the constitution
or laws of Ohio requiring of us, either the performance of any such
act, or even the one now asked by the motion before us. If either
could be legally done at all, it would have to be done in the exercise
of the-judicial power of the United States. But how are 'we to be
enabled to exercise the judicial power of the United States, 'when
by the express provision of the constitution, all the judicial power
of the United States is vested in one Supreme Court, and such
inferior courts as Congress shall ordain and establish, the judges of
which, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and receive a
fixed compensation from the general government.
It is claimed, however, that the government of the United States
is a national government, of which the States are mere subordinate
departments, so that the judicial power of the several States, and
that of the United States, are blended, and must be regarded as
one and th~e same, and consequently that the courts of each may be
enabled to exercise authority by virtue of the judicial power of the
other. This involves an inquiry into the true theory and nature of
our system of government in regard to a matter not depending on
mere speculation, but a true exposition of which is to be found by
reference to the constitution itself, and the public records and history
of its formation.
A national government is the government of the people of a
single State or nation united as a community by what is termed the
social compact, and possessing complete and perfect supremacy over
persons and things, so far as they can be made the lawful objects of
civil government. A federal government is distinguished from a
nationalgovernment, by its being the government of a community
of independent and sovereign States, united by compact. The
thirty-ninth number of the "Federalist," furnishes the followin
distinction between a national and federal government:
"The idea of a national government involves in it not only an authority over the
individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over allpersons and things, so far
as they are objects-of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one
nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among
communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general, and
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partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are
subordinate to the Supreme: and may be controlled, directed or abolished by it at
pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent
portionsof the supremacy,-no more subject within their iespectivespheresto the generalauthority, than the general authorityis subject to them within its own sphere. In this relation,
then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a national one, since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several states a
residuary and inviolable sovereigaty over all other objects."

Originally each State of the American Union was, in the language of the Declaration of Independence, " free and independent,"
possessing all the powers and supremacy of a separate and distinct
nation of people. The Constitution of the United States originated
from the confederation of the states under the Articles of Confederation of 1778, the first and second articles of which were as
follows :
AnTECLE 1. The style of this confederacy shall be " The United States of America."
ARTICLE 2. Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this confederation expressly delegated
to the United States in Congress assembled."

It is not pretended by any, that this confederacy possessed the
elements of a national government, but it is admitted to have been
a simple compact between independent states for mutual defence,
and some other general purposes. It is claimed by some, however,
that by the Constitution of the United States, the sovereignty of
the people of each State was surrendered and transferred to the
people of all the States in the aggregate, and that thus, the people
of all the States of the Union, became consolidated into one single
community or nation. The history of the formation of the Constitution exposes the utter fallacy of such an idea. The convention
which framed the Constitution, was called not by the act or authwrity
of the people of the several States in mass, but-by a resolution of
the Congress, the organ of the several States under the confederacy.
And it was called not for the purpose of establishing a national
government, but on the contrary, in the language of the resolution
of the Congress of the confederacy calling the convention, "for
the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several State legislatures,
such alterations and provisions therein, as shall render the federal
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constitution adequate to the exigencies of the government, and the
preservation of THE UNION."
The object of the convention is here most explicitly defined. It
was, not to establish a national government for the people of all the
States, and thereby abolish the State sovereignties ; but solely and
expressly to revise the articles of confederation between the severalStates, &c. With this distinctly defined object in view, the delegates to that convention were appointed, not by the authority of the
people of the States in the aggregate, but by the legislatures of the
several States. And the commissions from the several States to their
delegatees in this convention expressly limited their authority to this
definite object, for which the convention was convened. In the convention which framed the Constitution the delegates voted by States,
and after its formation, it was submitted to the several States and ratified, not by the whole people of the United States, but by each State
acting separately and for itself as an independent sovereignty.
The formation and ratification of the Constitution, therefore, was
not the act of the people of the States collectively, but the act of the
people of each state acting separately and independently for themselves. And the distinctly defined object with which it was done,
was, not the establishment of a consolidated national government
for the people. of the whole United States, as one community or nation, but the simple revision of the Articles of Confederation and the
establishment of a government based on the federal compact. This
is fully sustained by the views of Mr. Madison, expressed in the
number of the Federalist last above quoted, in which he said:
"This assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to
which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several
States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people
themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a national
but afederalact."

And the author continues:
"That it will be afederal, and not a national act, as these terms are understood
by the objectors, the act of the people as forming so many independent States, not
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as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is
to result neither from the decision of a majority of the people of the Union, nor that
of a majority of the States. It must result from the unanimousassent of the several
States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than
in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people
themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation,
the will of the majority-of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority,
and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States, as evidence of'
the will of the majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules
has been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a
sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary
act. In this relation, then, the new constitution will, if established, be a federal and
not a national constitution."

Those who insist on the appellate power of the Supreme Court of
the United States in question, cannot consistently repudiate the
authority of the '"Federalist."
The preamble to the constitution has been appealed to, in support
of the doctrine, that the Constitution of the United States was
ordained and established by, and for, the people of the States collectively, as a distinct community or nation. This argument is
founded upon a mere literal interpretation of the preamble, wholly
disregarding the true authority by which the constitution was established, the source from which its powers were derivcd, and the true
nature and objects of the powers delegated. The preamble reads,
" We, thepeople of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, &c., do ordain and establish this constitution of the
United States of America." What is here meant by the expression,
I"
It expresses the authority
"IVe, the people of the United States
by which the thing was done. It means the people by whose authority the constitution was formed and ratified. It was the act of forming and ratifying the constitution which ordained and established it.
It was formed by delegates appointed by the representatives of the
people of the several States in their respective State legislatures; and
it was ratified by the several States, through a convention of delegates in each State, elected by the people of the State, each State,
in doing the same, acting for itself and by the authority of its

STUNT vs. THE STEAMBOAT OHIO.

people, as a separate and independent nation. The constitution,
therefore, was ordained and established, not by the whole people of
the United States collectively, or in mass, as a distinct community,
but by the several States, the people of each acting in the name and
by the authority of their State, as a distinct, independent, sovereign
people. It is, therefore, incontestible, that the words of the preamble, "We, the people of the United States," mean the people of the
several States of the Union, not collectively and in mass, but as
the people of distinct independent States, acting by their respective
separate State authorities,in forming a compact with each other,
and establishing a federal government, or government, the parties
to which were distinct communities, or independent States, as contradistinguished from the people of all the States taken collectively
or in mass. At the time of the formation of the constitution, the
States were members of the confederacy united under the style of
"The United States of America," and upon the express condition
that "each State retains its sovereignty,freedom and independence."
And the consideration that, under the confederation, "We, the
people of the United States of America," indubitably signified the
people of the several States of the Union, as free, independenf and
sovereign States," coupled with the fact that the constitution was
a continuation of the same Union, and a mere revision or remodelling of the confederation, is absolutely conclusive that, by the term,
"The United States," is meant the several States united as independent and sovereign communities; and by the words, "We, the
people of the United States," is meant the people of the several
States as distinct and sovereign communties, and not the people of
the whole United States collectively as a nation.
The preamble declares that the constitution was ordained and
established "for the United States of America." And as "The
United States" means the several States united by compact under
a federal government of limited and expressly defined powers, it
follows, that the constitution was ordained and established for the
people of the several States as distinct communities, by whom
it was ordained and established. The omission to enumerate the
States by name, by which and for which the constitution was
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ordained and established, makes nothing against this interpretation. It appears from the proceedings in the convention
which formed the constitution, that the first draft of the constitution contained an enumeration of the States by name, after the
word " PEOPLE ;" but after the adoption of the seventh and last
article, providing that "the ratification of the conventions of nine
States should be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution
between the States so ratifying the same," it became necessary to
strike out the enumeration of the States by name, which was accordingly done. See Madison's Debates, vol. 1, p. 1539.
The objects for which the constitution was ordained and established are explicitly defined in the preamble. Had the object been
to abolish the States as independent and sovereign communities,
and establish a national government for the American people collectively, as constituting one consolidated distinct community, it
would have effected a change far greater than that which was
effected by the American Revolution; and that purpose would have
been manifested by provisions leaving no ground for cavil or doubt.
But the objects of the constitution declared in the preamble, differ
very little from the purposes of the confederation as declared, in the
third number of the Articles of Confederation. The objects announced in the constitution are, to form a more perfect union,
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, providefor the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." These purposes are
very far from indicating an intention to establish a consolidated
national government. The first purpose named, is that of forming
a more perfect union, thus recognizing the existing union between
the several States, under the confederation,- and simply proposing
to render it more perfect. What union is here contemplated? The
question admits of but one answer. The union between the independent and sovereign States already existing. The federal character of the government is here explicitly declared as distinguished
from a consolidated national government of the American people.
And when we consider the constitution as ordained and established
by the people of, the several States, for themselves, as distinct and
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sovereign communities, the objects announced in the preamble are
plain and easy of comprehension. They were to perfect theirunion
as distinct and sovereign communities; to establish justice among
them; to insure their domestic tranquillity; to provide for their
common defence and general welfare ; and to secure the blessings
of liberty to them and their posterity, as the people of several distinct communities. And the provisions in the body of the constitution, in every article, when correctly construed, fully confirm the
views here expressed. Calhoun's Works, vol. 1, 130 and 137.
According to the doctrine of the "Federalist," however, in one
part of the work, the government of the United States is partly
federal and partly national in its operation, and in the source from
which its powers are derived. This position, however, will not bear
the -test of examination. The Constitution is admitted to be federal,
and not national by the same work, as has been already shown.
And inasmuch as the government derives all its powers from the
Constitution, and is organized on the basis of it, and indeed constituted by it, how the government can be national in any part, or in
any sense, is not easy of comprehension. According to the theory
of our institutions, sovereignty vests in the people, and government
is constituted by a delegation of civil power in trust for the purposes prescribed. If the general government is to any extent, or
in any sense, a national government, it must be to that extent, or
in that sense, the government of the whole people of the several
States collectively, or as one consolidated community; and this
could not have been brought about, without the people of the several States surrendering their sovereignty, and transferring it, not
to the government, but to the whole people of the States collectively. It has been said that sovereignty is a thing, which from its
nature is not susceptible of division-that the sovereign power may
delegate authority and prescribe limits for its exercise; but cannot
surrender a portion of its sovereignty, without ceasing to be the
repository of the sovereignty of a State or nation. Without stopping to inquire into the correctness of this position, it is sufficient
to say, that there is no provision in the Constitution of the United
States, or act in its formation and adoption, which amounts to any7
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thing like a surrender of sovereignty by the people of the several
States, and a transfer of it to the whole people of the States collectively, as a distinct community, or consolidated nation of people.
The particulars in which the Federalist claims the governfilent
to be partly nationaland partly federal, are the following: First,
in regard to'the House of Representatives in Congress; second, in
regard to the Executive Department; and lastly, in regard to the
power of Amendment. As to the first, it is said, in number thirtynine of the work, that '"the House of Representatives will derive
its powers fiom the people of America, and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same .principle, as they
are in a legislature of a particular State ;" and that so far the government is national, and not federid, &c. The fallacy of this doctrine is most glaring. All the powers of the government, including
those of the House of Representatives, are derived from the Constitution; and the powers of the Constitution are delegated, not by
the American people in the aggregate, as a distinct community or
nation, but by the people of the several States, as separate, independent and sovereign States. . And consistently with the Constitution, it is not competent to elect the members of the House of
Representatives by the American people collectively, as a distinct
community; on the contrary, by the express provisions of the Constitution, they are required to be elected by the people of the several States, not as composing mere districts of one great community,
but as distinct and independent States. The first bill which passed
Congress, apportioning the members of the House of Representatives among the several States, was vetoed by President Washington, expressly on the ground that it assumed as its basis that the
people of the several States composed mere election districts of one
great community, instead of being, as in truth they are under the
Constitution, distinct and independent parties to the compact upon
which the government is founded. By the terms of the Constitution, the representatives are apportioned among the several States,
in a mode expressly prescribed, and they are required to be elected
by the people of the several States, as independent communities.
They may be elected by the people of any State, either by general
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ticket or by districts; so that the members of the House of Representatives, be the mode of election -what it may, are elected as the
delegates of the several States in their distinct, independent and
sovereign character as members of the Union. Neither is it true,
that the people of each State are represented in the House of Representatives oft the same principle, and in the same proportion as
they are in the legislature of each State. On the contrary, it is an
incontestible fact that they are represented in their respective State
legislatures as mere individuals, and by election districts entirely
under the control of each State, and by a ratio or proportion.
fixed by each State for itself, and different in different States.
As to the executive department, the argument is equally groundless. The President of the United States*is elected not by the
whole.people of the United States in the aggregate as a distinct
community or people, but by electors appointed by each State
separately and for itself, "in such mnanner as the legislature
thereof may diret;" and the electors are expressly required to
meet and vote in their respective States. And in case of a failure
of an election by the electoral college, when the election devolves
on the House of Representatives, the votes are required to be taken
by States, the representation from each State having one vote, &c.
And as to the mode prescribed for the exercise of the amending
power, it is plainly and expressly derived from, and exercised under
the authority of the people of the several States, acting in their
original, distinct, and sovereign character, and not under the authority
of the whole people of the States ,regarded in the aggregate, as a
distinct nation. And the modification of the original creating
power requiring the consent of each State to make it a party to the
constitution, which provides for the amendment of the constitution
by three-fourths of the States, voting as States, without regard to
population, certainly gives no national character to the government,
neither is it inconsistent with the federal character of the Union,
inasmuch as it is provided for by express agreement in the com-.
pact.
On the whole, it may be said, without the slightest ground forcontradiction, that in the formation of the government of the.
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United States, the whole people of the States collectively as a
distinct community or nation, were wholly unknown, and in no
respect whatever the source of power; and also, that in no operation whatever of the general government, is the action of the people
of the States in the aggregate as a nation, known or recognized
in any manner or form whatever. Indeed, the people of the several
States of the American union never have, at any stage of their
existence, been consolidated into a single community, so as to
constitute one distinct people or nation; and as such of course
never could have exercised any agency or participation, either in
the formation or in the administration of this system of government.
From what has beefi said, it must be apparent, that the government of the United States was ordained and established by the people of the several States as distinct, independent,and sovereign com9nunities; and that while the governments of the several States derive
their respective powers from the people as individuals united under
the social compact in their respective States, the government of the
United States derives its powers from the States as organized
communities, united by federal compact. Each State government
is a government of a community of people, while that of the United
States, is a government of a community of States. A State government and the United States government are operative in each
State ; and each has its distinct, independent sphere pf action. The
main objects of the authority of the general government, are the
relations of the States with each other, and with foreign nations,
and the common defence and welfare of the federal union; leaving
the internal affairs and domestic interests of the people of each
State to the authority of the State government. The delegated
powers appertaining to government are divided between these two
governments, and each is divested of what the other possesses;
each acting for itself, and by its own separate authority, the powers
of each being entirely distinct and independent of the other, it
follows of necessity, that the two governments are equal and coordinate governments in each State of the union; each paramount
and supreme within the sphere of its powers. The confederation
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which preceded the constitution of the United States, was subordinate to the State governments, upon which, to a great extent, it
was dependent. To remedy the deficiencies of the confederation,
the powers delegated by the constitution were made independent of
the States. So that the government of the union and that of the
several States, having each distinct and independent powers, and each
distinct and independent spheres of action, become equal and eo-ordinate governments. It follows as a necessary consequence, that each
of the two governments being independent of the other, each must-be
supreme within the sphere of its operations, and neither can be
subordinateto the other. So that, the judicial, as well as the legislative and executive powers of each, must of necessity be, not only
entirely distinct and separate, but also independent of each
other.
This view of the subject, so far as the separate, independent and
co-ordinate judicial power of the two governments is involved, is fully
sustained by judicial decisions in both the State and in the federal
courts. In the case of .12_artin vs. Hunter, 1. Wheat. 304, the
Supreme Court of the United States declare the doctrine, that Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the United
States in any courts, except those which are ordained and established under the Constitution of the United States. It is universally admitted, that while Congress can impose no jurisdiction on
the State courts, it is equally incompetent for a State legislature to
impose jurisdiction on the federal courts.
It is contended further, that the Supreme Court of the United
States is the tribunal of last resort, clothed with authority to decide
all questions touching the extent of its own powers, and also, all
controversies involving a conflict between the authorities of the
federal and the several State governments, and that the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States over the
State courts, is necessarily incidental to, and results from this
power. That the Supreme Court of the United States is the court of
last resort to determine all cases which may be instituted under the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, is not controverted; but that this
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tribunal has not only absolute authority to determine the extent of
its own powers, but also constituted an um)ire to determine all
questions of conflict arising between the several States and the federal government, is denied, and will be contested so long as the people of this country are capable of preserving their government in
its original character. This arbitrary power once conceded, would
enable the Supreme Court of the United States to nullify State
laws, and even provisions in the State constitutions, whenever, in
the opinion of that tribunal, there existed any inconsistency between
them and any express or constructive authority, under the operation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. It
would annihilate the balance of power between equal and co-ordinate governments, and destroy that check upon the exercise of discretionary power, designed as the great safeguard against usurpation.
It is not claimed, I believe, that this high power is derived from
any specific provision of the Constitution; but it is claimed to be
right incident to the supremacy of all government, to decide as to
the extent of its own powers, and to use all the necessary means to
enforce its own authority. However this may be applicable as an
incident to a single government, vested with all the powers appertaining to government, it is clearly inapplicable to a system where
the powers are divided between two distinct and co-ordinate governments, as is the case here. The very fact that these two distinct
governments in one system, are co-ordinate,necessarily implies that
they are equal, and excludes the idea of superior and subordinate.
If either has the exclusive right to judge of the extent of its own
powers, and also of that of its co-ordinate, and enforce its decision
-gainst the authority of the other by physical power, not only
would equality between them be destroyed, but the one would be
raised from an equal to a suerior, and the other be reduced from
an equal to a subordinate. And the subordinate, thus stripped of
the incident appertaining to all government, to judge of the extent
of its own powers with a view to their protection, would necessarily
sink to the condition of a dependent. Where there is a division of
power between co-ordinate departments of the same government,
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each designed as a check upon the other, each must be allowed to
judge of the extent of its powers, and to maintain its decision
against the other. Without this, there can be no division of power.
To vest power in two departments, and give one of them the exclusive right to judge of the extent not only of its own powers, and
how much was allotted to the other, would be no division of power
at all. The one would, in effect, hold under the other. But where
two governments are distinct, independent and co-ordinate, each
must possess all the necessary incidental powers appertaining to
government, within the sphere of its powers, and consequently both
must possess the right to judge of the extent of their respective
powers, with reference to each other. And no reason can be
assigned why one should be allowed the exclusive right to judge as
to the extent of its own powers, and enforce its decision, more than
the other. It is, therefore, one of the necessary incidents to the
nature of distinct, independent and co-ordinate governments under
the same system, that each operate as a mutual check upon the
other. And in case of conflict of authwrity, resort is not to be had
to force; for neither has the right to force its own decision upon
the other. But the appeal is to the people, the sovereign and original source of power, which acts through the ballot-box upon the
legislation of the country, both State and federal, and when found
necessary, can alter the Constitution by amendment.
But it is insisted, that as the constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States are declared to be the supreme laws of the land,
as the general government is supreme within its own sphere, this
supremacy necessarily requires, all questions of conflict between its
powers, and those of any of the States to be determined by the authority of the federal government. But as the constitution and laws of
the several States are equally supreme to the extent of their operation, and each State government equal and co-ordinate witlr that of
the United States, the inference mentioned is wholly unwarranted.
That there is no repugnancy or incompatibility in the supremacy
of each of these co-ordinate powers, and that the supremacy of the
gefieral government does not destroy the independence of the State
sovereignties, was explained by Mr. Hamilton, in the convention of
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INew York, on the occasion of the ratification of the Constitution of
the United States, in the following language, lucid, forcible, and
conclusive :
"

With regard to thejurisdiction of the government, so I shall certainly admit that the

Constitution ought to be so formed, as not to prevent the States from providing for
their own existence; and I maintain that it is so formed, and that their power of
providing for themselves is sufficiently established.

This is conceded by one gentle-

man, and in the next breath, the concession is retracted. - He says, Congress have
but one exclusive right in taxation, that of duties on imports
other powers are concurrent.

certainly, then, their

But to take off the force of this obvious conclusion,

he immediately says that the laws of the United States are supreme, and that where
there is one supreme, there cannot be concurrent authority; and further, that
where the laws of the Union are supreme, those of the States must be subordinate,
because there cannot be two supremes.
This is curious sophistry. That two
supreme powers cannot act together is false. They are inconsistent only when
they are aimed at each other, or at one indivisible object.

The laws of the

United States are supreme, as to all their proper constitutional objects; the laws
of the States are supreme in the same way.
different objects without clashing;
the same

common

These supreme laws may act on

or they may operate on different parts of

object with perfect harmony.

Suppose both governments

should lay a tax of a penny on a certain article, has not each an independent
and uncontrollable power to collect its own tax? The meaning of the maxim,
there cannot be two supremes, is simply this; two powers cannot be supreme
over each other."

See Elliott's Debates,-vol 1, p. 315.

Again, Mr. Hamilton on this subject, in the 33d number of the
"Federalist," used the following lnguage :
"But it is said, that the laws of the Union are to be the supreme laws of the land.
What inference can be drawn from this, or what would they amount to if they were
not supreme? It is evident they would amount to nothing. A law by the very
meaning of the term includes supremacy. It is a rule, which those to whom it is
prescribed, are bound to observe.

This results from every political association.

If

individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of political societies enter into a
larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers
entrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over those societies,
and the individuals of whom they are composed.

It would otherwise be a mere

treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a government, which is
only another word for politicai power and supremacy.

But it will not follow from

this doctrine, that acts of the larger society, which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller
societies, will become the suprame law of the land.
usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such.

These will be mere acts of
Hence we perceive, that the
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clause wbich declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we have
just before considered, only declares a truth which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of the federal government."

The doctrine that the Supreme Court of the United States is the
tribunal constituted to determine all questions touching the extent
of the powers of the State and the federal governments, and with
authority to restrain the action of the sovereign power of the states
by annulling State laws, and reversing the judgments of the State
courts, imports an extraordinary exercise of power, for which there
should exist a clear and express warrantin the Constitution. The
question ofthe existence of this power has been very frequently brought
before the Supreme Court of the United States, and instead of meeting
the question and showing an unquestionable authority for it in the
Constitution, that tribunal has attempted to maintain it upon
various grounds, and among the rest, by a resort to an argument
founded on the supposed danger of the abuse of power by the
States, derogatory to the sovereign character of the States. Mr.
Justice Story, in the case of Martin vs. Hunter, to maintain this
alleged power, said, "tthe constitution has presumed (whether
rightly or wrongly, we do not inquire,) that State attachments,
State prejudices, State jealousies and State interests, might sometimes obstruct or control, or be suppposed to obstruct or control, the
regular administration of justice." Although our government
was designed to be a government of checks and balances, to
restrain the abuse of power in all its departments, this -argument
of the learned judge is not strictly in character with the subject
of which he speaks. In the case of Cohens vs. 7irginia,McCulloch
vs. Maryland, and several other cases, language similar in effect
has been used by the Supreme Court of the United States, imputing
interested motives, prejudice, and passion to the State courts, as
the reason for its own jurisdiction. And in the case of Gordon vs.
Longest, 16 Peters, 98, that court adjudged that one great
object of the establishment of the federal courts, and regulating
their jurisdiction, was to have a tribunal in each State, presumed
to be free from local influence ! Now, it is at least novel, that a
judicial tribunal should claim jurisdiction for itself, upon the ground
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that other courts equally disinterested, would be subject to improper
motives and influences. Where there has been judicial action by a
court of competent jurisdiction, all presumptions are in favor of the
correctness of the adjudication, while it remains in force, and the
imputation of improper motives or influences are not to be allowed.
It is essential to the supremacy of all civil government, that the
passions and motives of men should not be imputed to the exercise
of sovereignty. Although it is undoubtedly true that the feelings
of men do enter more or less into most of the acts of sovereign
power, yet it cannot be allowed for one set of men clothed with
power, to allege the danger of the abuse of power by others in the
exercise of authority, as a foundation upon which to build up power
for themselves. In reference to the language of the Supreme Court
of the United States, in the case of 111cCulloch vs. Maryland, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky placed this subject in a view so
forcible and strong, that I deem it proper to make the following
extract from the opinion, in the case of Thc Commonwealth vs.
Morrison et al., 2 Kentucky Rep. 537.
"The power to do good is, throughout allagency, except that of absolute perfection, the power to do evil. If the power of action were denied to all who could
not pervert it, Deity alone could act. But the doctrine upon which the agency of
the world hangs, is the very reverse: it is that power possessed may be used subject
to the responsibility of the agent for its abuse. And it is upon this principle alone
that we can have any just notions of morals, and of rewards and punishments.
But sovereignty has a fictitious perfection and purity, which must be taken as real,
and which cannot be controverted. Of course the abuse of power cannot be
imputed to a sovereign, in restraint of its legitimate energies. The maxim that the
King can do no wrong, is not an idle device of royalty formed to amuse or beguile
the multitude: nor is the correspondent maxim, that the voice of the people is the
voice of God, the offspring of the demagogue's brain. They are both just inferences
drawn from the most profound views of civil policy, and illustrate the position
advanced in relation to the purity and perfection of sovereignty. It is not that the
king in a monarchy, or the people in a democracy, can do no wrong-for we know
they are men, and of course partake of the frailties inseparable from human nature:
as men they err frequently and egregiously. But it is the sovereignty with which
they are invested, and in which they are merged, that is incapable of error. This
incapacity in the sovereign to err, is matter of necessity. There is no tribunal
before which the sovereign can be arraigned, his conduct examined, his errors and
delinquencies detected, those errors corrected, and he punished. Sovereignty.
therefore, whether displayed in the monarch or the multitude, possesses necessarily
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this putative perfection; and is of course necessarily irresponsible. Upon this
purity and unerring character of sovereignty, depends allthe jurisdictions which
are exercised in the governments throughout the world. Government could not
exist upon any other hypothesis."

It seems to have been deemed necessary even to humble and degrade the sovereignty of the several states, in order to maintain the
high assumptions of power claimed for the federal government.
Where is the provision of the constitution to be found, which
ordains the Supreme Court of the United States as the only tribunal, or the tribunal of last resort, to determine all questions or
controversies touching the boundary of the jurisdiction of the two
governments, State and federal? The people were sparing and
cautious in the powers they conferred on the general government,
and particular to have them expressly and clearly defined. It is
fair to presume that so important a matter as this would not have
been left to mere implication or construction, had it been the intention to confer it. It is true, the "Federalist" comes in as authority
to sustain this assumption. In the 39th number of this work, Mr.
Madison used this language: "It is true, that in controversies
relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal
which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general
government." But if nothing else, the loose opinion here expressed,
of itself, is most clearly sufficient to show that this work is not to
be relied on in a legal investigation ; because Mr. Madison, after
ten years' observation of the practical o erations of the government,
under the federal constitution, upon the most grave and deliberate
consideration, expressed a directly opposite opinion, in his celebrated
report and resolutions, adopted in the legislature of Virginia, in
January, 1800, the following extract from which will be found conclusive and unanswerable on this subject:
"On this objection it might be observed, first, that there may be many instances
of usurped power, which the forms of the constitution would never draw within the
control of the judicial department; secondly, that if the decision of the judiciary
be raised above the authority of the sovereign parties to the constitution, the decisions of the other departments, not carried by the forms of the constitution before
the judiciary, must be equally authoritative and final
with the decisions of that department; but the proper answer to the objection is, that the resolution of the General
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Assembly relates to those great and extraordinary cases in 'which all the forms of the
constitution may prove ineffectual against infractions dangerous to the essential rights
of the parties to it. The resolution supposes that dangerous powers, not delegated,
may not only be usurped and executed by the other departments, but that the judicial departments also may exercise or sanction dangerous powers beyond the grant
of the constitution ; and consequently, that the ultimate right of the parties to the
constitution, to judge whether the compact has been dangerously violated, must
extend to violations by one delegated authority as 'well as by another, by the judiciary as well as by the executive or legislative."
"However true, therefore, it may be, that the judicial department is, in all questions submitted to it by the forms of the constitution, to decide in the last resort,
this resort must necessarily be deemed the last in relation to the authorities of the
other departments of the government; and not in relation to the rights of the parties
to the constitutional compact, from which the judicial as well as the other departments hold their delegated trusts. On any other hypothesis, the delegation of judicial power would annul the authority delegating it; and the concurrence of this
department with the others in usurped powers might subvert forever, and beyond
the possible reach of any rightful remedy, the very constitution which all were
instituted to preserve."

If the Supreme Court of the United States is constituted the
tribunal of last resort, to determine all controversies touching the
extent of the powers of the two governments, it must be either by
an express grant in the constitution, or by its being incidental to
some express power. As there is no ekpress grant of this kind in
the constitution, I inquire to what express power in the constitution is this incidental, or in other words, in what express grant is it
implied as a necessary means of executing the express power ?
For there can be no contingent without a principal. It will not
be pretended that it is incidental to any of the legislative or any
of the executive powers delegated in the first and second articles
of the constitution. Can it be derived from any of the powers of
the judiciary, in the third article ? And if so, which one ? It
has been already shown, that the appellatepower of the Supreme'
Court conferred in this article, manifestly extends no further
than appeals from the subordinate federal courts. And as to
the provision which defines the subjects of the jurisdiction of the
federal judiciary, it has been already shown that the jurisdiction of
the federal courts is not made exclusive ; and it is an undeniable
fact, that since the origin of the government, the concurrent juris-
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diction of the State courts over many of these subjects has been
exercised, and universally conceded. By no rational implication,
therefore, can it be deduced from this provision. Where, then,
is this power to be found in the constitution? It cannot be derived from any of the miscellaneous provisions of article fourth,
or the amendatory provision of "article fifth. The second clause
of the sixth article declares that the Constitution of the United
States, and the 'laws made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, and that the judges in every State shall be
bound thereby; and the next succeeding clause requires of the officers of the State governments, an oath to support the constitution,
&c. There is clearly nothing here, conferring upon the Supreme
Court of the United States the important power in question. This
mere declaration of the character and operative effect of the constitution, laws, &c., of the United.States, is no grant of power. And
it is admitted, that the constitution and laws of each State are
equally the supreme law of the land within the sphere of their
operation. Suppose an act passed by Congress, not in pursuance
of the Constitution of the United States. It is not required to be
regarded by the State judges as the supreme law of the land. Indeed, their oath to support the Constitution of the United States
would require them to disregard it. But where is the provision
of the constitution which makes the Supreme Court of the United
States the exclusive arbiter, or tribunal of last resort, to determine whether the laws be made pursuant to the constitution or
not ? If this power be necessary, and yet not delegated, the con-

stitution should be amended. A power of such grave import
should not be exercised without a clear warrant for it in the constitution. -Ii will not do to conclude that a power has been delegated by the constitution, simply because we may conceive it to be
highly necessary and proper, when we are unable to find authority
for it in the constitution.
But, it not only appears that the Constitution contains no
provision giving to the Supreme Court of the United States, any
such power, but it appears from the public records, that the convention which framed the constitution, positively refused to confer on
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the federal government, any such supervisory power over the States.
The proposition was made in the convention repeatedly, and in a
great variety of forms, but in every instance, and every form in
which proposed, it was finally" defeated. The first project for a
constitution submitted in the convention, was by Edmund Randolph,
which proposed to vest this supertisory power in a national legislature. See Madison Papers, Vol. 2, p. 732. This was changed in
the committee of the whole, to which Mr. Randolph's proposition
was referred, and a provision reported, giving to the "national
judiciary, jurisdiction of all questions which involve the national
peace and harmony." Same vol. 861. Charles Pinckney's draft
of a constitution submitted to the convention, contained a proposition, that "the legislature of the United States should have the
power to revise the laws of the several States that may be supposed
to infringe the powers exclusively delegated by this constitution to
Congress, and to negative and annul such as do." Ibid. 745. On
page 821 of this work, we learn that Mr. Pinckney made his proposition to vest this power in the national legislature, by motion, in
committee of the whole. Pending the discussion of this propositioD,
Mr. Madison suggested lodging this power in the Senate alone,
(page 827.) Mr. Hamilton's draft of a constitution, contained a
proposition, providing by express declaration that all State laws,
contrary to the constitution and laws of the United States, should
be utterly void ; and further, that the governor, or president of
each State, should be appointed by the general government, with a
negative upon all such laws at the time of their passage. Ibid
892.
When, therefore, the constitution not only contains no provision,
conferring upon the federal government this supervisory power over
the States, but when the proposition to confer such a power was
distinctly and repeatedly made in various forms in the constitution,
and in every instance finally defeated, and when, on the adoption
of the constitution, some of the States required an amendment to
the constitution, which was agreed to, expressly providing, that all
powers not delegated by the constitution, were reserved, with what
fairness and sound reason, can the delegation of a power be insisted
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upon, so important in its import, so controlling and absorbing in its
operation, and so utterly destructive of the equality and independence essential to the very existence of co-ordinate powers. It is
idle to speak of the two governments as being independent and coordinate, of each being supreme -within the sphere of its own powers,
if one has the exclusive power to determine all questions touching,
not only the extent of its own powers, but also the extent of the
powers of the other. Our system of government was established
upon the principle of a division of political power, with a view to
checks and safeguards to prevent its abuse. And it is a fair conclusion, that it was not the intention of those who ordained and
established it, to vest discretionary or arbitrary power in any
department of the government. It has been the boast and pride
of this country, that our system of government, rested, not like
the arbitrary governments of other countries, upon physieal power
but on an enlightened public opinion, on the regard of the people
for prineiple, right, and justice, a practical concession -of the
right, and the capacity of the people for self-government. A
philsophical principle was adopted, believed to be applicable to the
political, as well as to the material world, that all organic action,
whether of human or divine mechanism, is the result of the reciprocal action and reaction of the parts of which it consists, and
capable of restricting its various powers to their appropriate
spheres, and compelling the performance of their respective functions. This was accomplished by a division of political power, and
calling into operation checks and safeguards against its abuse, by
the mutual action and reaction of the various departments upon
each other. And in regard to the most important power of government, that of the supreme power, which according to all experience,
had never failed in other countries and ages, to overleap all the
barriers and restraints of human contrivance, two equal and coordinate governments, State and federal, were established, each
equally supreme within its appropriate sphere of action; and as to the
boundary which separates their powers, and limits their extent, a
-mutualchelek upon each other. This made each the protector of
the powers assigned to it, and of which, it is the organ and the
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representative. Without this mutual check, or power of each, to
restrain the other to its appropriate sphere, the stronger would
finally absorb the supremacy of the weaker, and cbncentrate all
power in itself.
That collision or conflict of these co-ordinate powers might arise,
was not beyond anticipation. That is an occasional incident of
every division of power, whether it be that of co-ordinate departments, co-ordinate estates or classes, co-ordinate governments, or
any other division of powers appertaining to governmient. It is one
of the evils to which constitutional government based on a division
of powers must be always to some extent exposed. But we have to
take things as they are, with all their incidents, good or bad, as
perfection is not to be found in human institutions, and the choice
is between a constitutional government of limited powers, and an
absolute government exposed to all the oppressions and abuses
incident to uncontrollable power. In case of collision or conflict of
authority between these two co-ordinate governments, neither can
claim by the Constitution the exclusive and arbitrary power of determination, and of enforcing its decision by physical power. If a
single State had the power sua sponta, to nullify a law of the United
States, and arrest its operation by its own act, that would destroy
the independence of the federal government as an equal and coordinate power with that of each State. The federal government
and that of the several States being each supreme within their
respective spheres of action, are clothed each with authority to
enforce the execution of its own laws. But in case of conflict
between the authorities of the two governments in the execution of
their respective powers, the controversy will ordinarily give rise to
a question which would go before the judicial tribunals. If it arise
in a case over which the State courts have exclusive jurisdiction,
their determination will be final and conclusive as to the parties in
the case; if in a case over which the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction, their determination will be final. But if the question
arise in a case over which the courts of the two governments have
concurrent jurisdiction, the determination of the courts of that in
which the jurisdiction first attached must be final and conclusive
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-upon the parties in the case. In case the principle settled in the
State courts be wholly inconsistent and irreconcilable with that
settled in the federal courts, and from this conflict of decision or
otherwise a conflict of authority in the execution of the laws ensue,
the adjustment of the difficulty must be transferred from the delegated trusts of civil authority to the sovereign power resting in the
people of the several States. If this sovereign power, acting through
the ballot box, not only upon legislation, but also upon the executive
and the judicial powers of the two governments, fails to supply the
requisite corrective, there remains the further remedy of amending
the Constitution. These are the peaceable remedies provided bythe Constitution. If these all fail, if notwithstanding appeals topublic sentiment, remonstrance and negotiation with all proper.
forbearance, the federal government for example, should recklessly.
persist in a course of usurpation of power utterly destructive to the.
independence and sovereignty of the States, there could remain no.
course but a resort to the original rights of the people of each. State
as an independent community.
It has been supposed by some, that inasmuch as the supreme.
judicial power of the United States was controlled by great and
good men, and learned experienced jurists, there could be no danger
of entrusting the determination of all controversies touching the
extent of the powers of the two governments to their judgment and
discretion. Although this is not strictly pertinent to the question of.*
the competency of the power, yet it may be remarked that the highest
moral obligations,-truth, justice, and plighted faith, have never.
furnished a safe and certain barrier against the abuse of pow-r,that when entrusted with arbitrary power, human nature has very:
rarely been found proof against the shifts and devices of cupidity
and ambition. No man has a higher respect, and indeed greaterveneration than I have for the great and good men who have.
adorned the Bench of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Ohio is now and has bedn for many years honored with one of hermost illustrious citizens on that Bench, in whose integrity and elevated purity of character all have confidence. It is known full well
that he would not willingly abuse any trust of civil power, and there
8
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is no man living to the rectitude of whose intentions I would sooner
trust arbitrary civil power than to him. But infallibility of judgment is not an attribute of human nature, and when we reflect on
the errors into which man has been lead in the exercise of arbitrary
power in other ages and countries, alas! how much is there to
humble man in the pride of his boasted intellectual and moral
elevation.
It is urged that some authority is absolutely necessary as the
supreme and final arbiter of all conflicts of power, between the
federal government and the several State governments. If this be
true, it is an argument in favor of an amendment of the Constitution, rather than an assumption of power by the federal government. A supposed necessity will not warrant an assumption of
power not to be found in the Constitution. If a supreme and final
arbiter to determine all questions of conflict of power between the
federal and State governments, be necessary, it should belong
.exelusively neither to the federal, nor to the State governments,
but it should be an intermediate power, selected by the consent of
,both, and under the exclusive control of veither one. This would
aeave the federal and the several State governments equal and coordinate governments, each a salutary check upon the other, in any
attempt to exercise an unwarranted power.
We humbly conceive that the independent co-ordinate authority
,of the several States as a check upon the general government, is a
matter of great and essential importance to the safety and purity
,of our institutions; and that, if the arbitrary power be conceded
to the federal government to determine all controversies touching
-not only its own powers, but also those involving the powers of the
several States, it must subvert the whole theory and structure of
,our government, and result in a consolidated national government.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United
States, it was insisted by many, that it was necessary to fortify the
-powers of the federal government against the powers and influence
,of the States; that the States would form combinations against the
federal government, and that the weakest point in our system of
government was a tendency to dissolution. The practical operation
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of the system has shown the utter fallacy of this opinion. The separate and distinct interests, local attachments, and rivalries between
several States, have counteracted all tendency to form combinations of
this hind. And in almost every instance which has occurred, ofa conflict between the powers of a State and the federal government, the
contest has been a most unequal one, for the State has had a struggle, not only against the powers and influence of the general government, but also against a combination of the other States, uniting
their power and influence with. that of the general government. It
is manifest that an element has entered into the operations of our
system of government, not fully anticipated at the time of its formation. The vast patronage and extensive emoluments of the general government has become an all-engrossing object of attention, and
concentrated a power and influence which enable the federal government to bring to its aid not only organized combinations of the
people, but also combinations of the greater part of the States.
It was supposed by the framers of the Constitution, that the
powers of the federal government would be held in check by the
popular elections. The practical operation of the system, however,
has demonstrated the utter fallacy of this expectation. The change
of administrations and officers under the federal government, as a
general thing, seems to have had but little effect, other than to
bring a fresh supply of persons into power, who struggle with
renewed vigor and increased recklessness for their various purposes
of ambition, cupidity aud aggrandizement.
The persons in the service and interest of the federal government,
throughout the vast expanse of country from the Atlantic to the
Pacific, upon the high seas, and in foreign countries, must exceed
two hundred and fifty thousand in number; and the dependants
and aspirants, who are expecting to profit by the powers of the
federal government, are more than five times that number. Besides
this, the extensive power and influence of the associated wealth of
the country, under the special privileges and immunities of corporations, have become, by means of the adjudications of the federal
judiciary, attached to the supremacy of the federal government, by
the all-controlling tie of self-interest. With such an accumulation
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and concentration of interests and influence, the federal government, collecting and disbursing annually a revenue of from sixty to
eighty millions of dollars, with the entire control of all the military
and naval forces, of all the military fortifications and munitions of
war throughout the country, wields a power surpassed by but few
governments in the world.
With its immense resources, vast patronage and extensive emoluments, con6ede to the federal government, the constructive powers
to the full extent claimed for it, unchecked by the co-ordinate powers of the several States, and nothing short of a revolution, can prevent its .becoming absolute.
The doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States, announced in the cases of 11'Culloeh vs. iJ1aryland, Osburn vs. The
Bank of the United States, Cohens vs. Virginia, and other cases,
invests Congress with discretionary power of the most extraordinary
character, derived from inference and implication. It is not required that the p)urpose of the measures adopted as a means to carry
into execution the express powers, should have this exclusively, or
indeed, mainly inview. It is sufficient, according to this doctrine,
to sustain the constitutionality of a measure, if the execution of an
express power be a mere incident to a measure, designed to effectuate other immediate and ulterior objects however great in their
consequences. *For example, in the case of M'Culloch vs.' Maryland,
the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States was sustained
as among the implied powers of Congress. The main objeet of this
measure was of course, the investment of the private capital of persons in the business of banking, lending money, discounting bills,
receiving money on deposit, and issuing bank notes for circulation.
This of itself, it was not pretended, that Congress had the power to
authorize. But inasmuch as the bank could be incidentally used,
as a place for the deposit and safe keeping of the money of the government, therefore, this measure most important for other purposes,
was sustained as among the means selected by Congress for the execution of the express powers of the government: and not bnly so,
but the extensive investments of private property in the stock of
this institution, in the several States, was declared to be withdrawn
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from the sovereign power of taxation by the States, because the bank
was thus incidentally used by the federal government. Under the
simple power, "to establist post offices and post roads," the authority has been claimed not only to construct roads, but to make canals,
and engage in a general system of internal improvements in the
states. And under the power "to raise and support armies," with
a view to the transportation of supplies and the munitions of war,
the authority has been claimed to engage, even, in the construction
of rail roads in foreign countries. A less violent implication would
enable the federal government to provide for a system of military
espionage in every city, hamlet or neighborhood throughout the
country. By such stretch of authority, by way of implication, inference, or construction, what stupendous scheme of aggrandizement, and enlargement of its powers, may not the general government embark in and sustain its constitutionality on the ground that
it incidentally, or in some way aids or can be used as a means to
aid in carrying into execution some of the express powers of the
government, although the chief and main purose of the measure,
be an entirely different and ulterior object.
With this doctrine of constitutional construction established, concede to the federal government, the power to determine in the last
resort, all controversaries touching, not only the extent of its own
powers, but also, the boundaries of the powers between the several
States, and the federal government, and all the safeguards and limitations of the express provisions in the constitution would be easily
overcome by the ingenious devices of implication and construction.
The ultimate result, would be inevitable. The States would be
stripped of their sovereignty and independence, and the federal government become, in effect at least, a consolidated, national government, concentrating all supremacy in itself. Civil power thus uncontrolled and absolute, in a government, so extensive in its operations, and with means and resources so vast as those of the United
States, would eventuate in the long train of abuses and oppressions
which have never failed to follow in the course of arbitrary civil
power.
It is clear, that it was not contemplated at the time of the forma-
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tion and adoption of the constitution, that any such exorbitant powers were to be conferred on the federal government; and by a strict
and fair construction of the donstitution, no such powers can be
maintained.
From the foregoing views, the following conclusions are deduced:
1st. That the provision of the constitution of the United States
expressly conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court,
does not authorize the exercise of appellate power by that tribunal,
over tei state courts, but extends simply to appeals from the subordinate federal courts.
2d. There is no provision in the constitution, from which, a supervising power in the Supreme Court of the United States, over the
state courts, can be derived by way of incident or implication.
3d. The Supreme Court of the United States, has not been constituted the exclusive tribunal of dernier resort, to determine
all controversies in relation to conflicts of authority between the
federal government and the several states of the American Union.
4th. That the State courts and the federal courts are co-ordinate
tribunals, having concurrent jurisdiction in numerous cases, but
neither having a supervising power over the other; and that, where
the jurisdiction is concurrent, the decision of that court, or rather,
of the courts of that judicial system, in which the jurisdiction first
attaches, is final and conclusive as to the parties.
The Supreme Court of the United States, therefore, not being
authorized by the constitution to exercise appellate jurisdiction over
the judgments of this court, there can be no authority for the entry upon our journals sought by the motion before us. To allow the
entry to be made in order to remove the cause to the Supreme Court
of the United States for action by that tribunal, which woulI le in
violation of the constitution which we have sworn to support, would be
a dereliction of duty upon our part.
Motion overruled.

WIGHTMAN vs. STAMBOAT GEORGE ALBERT.

Louisville Chancery Court, Kentucky.
WIGIIT3IAN VS. THE STEAMBOAT GEORGE ALBREE.
1. Statutoryliens on steamboats and other vessels.

2. Legislative competency to make such liens superior to the title of purchasers
without notice out of the State.
3. Comity of courts not of the State where the statute was passed.
4. Constitutional law.

5. The statute of Kentucky, which gives to material-men and others their lien upon
steamers, &c., is not unconstitutional in extending that lien to work done, &c.,
out of the State. But it cannot be applied in such case, as against a bonafide

purchaser in any other State, in which the lien does not exist, or has expired.

The opinion of the court was delivered August 18, 1855, by
PIRTLE, Ohancellor.-This is a proceeding in rem against the
steamboat, to subject her for work done and materials furnished in
building in the state of Pennsylvania.
The statute of this state p'rovides, that "1mechanics, tradesmen,
and others," shall have a lien on a steamboat or other vessel, "Ifor
work, supplies, materials, done or furnished on or towards the building or equipping the boat or vessel in this state," and when so done
or furnished out of the state, there shall be a like lien therefor,
"which shall have precedence next after that given when done or
furnished in this state, &c." The ninth section of the act, says
" The liens given by this chapter shall not be enforced against a
purchaser without actual notice thereof, unless suit be instituted
within one year from the time the cause of action accrued, or unless
notice thereof be endorsed on, or attached to the enrolment of the
boat or vessel."
By the law of Pennsylvania there was a lien on the boat for the
building and materials, but this lien was lost after the first voyage
of the boat from the state; and she had made two trips to St. Louis
in the state of Missouri, before this attachment. She had also been
sold by the original owners to others, who had sold her to the present claimants in Pennsylvania, before the attachment.
There are so many statutes in the different States in reference to
liens on steamboats, that it becomes necessary, in expounding the
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provisions of these acts, to look to the principles that govern the general words (or even the special language, sometimes,) used by them.
The counsel for the complainants contends, that it will satisfy our
statute to confine the remedy to our own boats, and more than this
would make the act unconstitutional, because it would give a right
to a party doing work, &c., abroad, which he did not have at home.
I do not see how this would violate any provision of the constitution. It would not impair the obligation of a contract, it only
affords a better remedy, a stronger obligation-just the reverse of
impair. It would be wrong in some instances, to afford a different
and stronger remedy than that existing when the contract was made,
and perhaps the only one contemplated by the parties; but this
wrong is not one to be prevented by the constitution ; it was not one
of the evils contemplated by the convention of 1787; but the taking
away the remedy existing nh11n the contract was'made, or the leaving an insufficient remedy, or in some other manner affecting the
obligation so as to weaken it, is within the meaning of the great
instrument.
It is competent for the legislature, too, to say that the lien
afforded by the act, to persons doing work,. &c., in Kentucky, shall
stand against bonafide purchasers, whether the purchase were made
in this state or out of it. If the purchase has been made in the
state, its validity and effect must necessarily depend on, or be subject to the state laws; if made out of the state, then still, with
regard to a lien declared by the state, a court in the state must be
bound by the force which the legislature has said the lien shall have.
The question is not one of equity, or right and justice, but of the power
of the legislature to say what consideration the court shall give to the
lien. If courts in other states were called on to enforce such a lien
against a purchaser without notice, they might well reject the principle,
for as an act of comity is all that could be asked of them, they 'would
have a right to look to the full justice of the case. With regard to
contracts of sale of boats made in this state, when the lien existed
for work, &c., done here, I think the courts abroad would feel bound
to enforce the lien as it would be done in our own courts.
I am satisfied that the legislature did intend to include boats
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belonging to other states. A question was suggested by the Court
of Appeals, in Strother, &c., vs. Lovejoy, 8 B. Mon., 136, as to
whether one of the liens given by the act of 1839, included vessels
not of this state, and when the revisors drew the late act, being
aware of this, the provisions of this new law were extended. The
terms are general on this kind of lien, for building, &c., and if boats
not of the state, vere not meant to be included, some exception
would have attended the general words. I am not sure, however,
that a case like this was intended to be included.
The question left, is, can the leg'slature include such a case as this ?
The counsel for the plaintiffs contend, that as the boat had passed
down and up the Ohio river, in that part within the domain of Kentucky, (for it must be recollected, that Kentucky claims the Ohio
from the mouth of the Big Sandy down) it had become subject to
the law of this state, that a lien was fixed. I do not see how that
could be. Passing by Kentucky or navigating the rivers of Kentucky in the interior, could have no effect on tie boat when she had
gone home untouched by any of Kentucky's process. When she
was back again in Pennsylvania, the law-of that state fixed no lien
upon her because she had been in Kentucky, and it is the law of
that state that must be looked to where nothing was done in this.
Then, there was no lien for the building: &c., any longer by the
laws of the state where the building, &c., were done. It had expired, it was declared not to exist by statute. The boat could be
sold by law there, and the whole property would pass free of debt,
and it is not within the legislative competency of this state to act
on the subject at all. It had no dominion over this purchase-it
belonged exclusively to Pennsylvania; nothing was left for this
state to act upon, except with respect to the title, and that was good
in the state where it was made. We need not appeal to the constitution about this. There is no provision on such a subject. None
was needed, any more than a provision in that instrument that the
legislature shall not take the property of A and give it to B.
Such is not a legislative power at all; (so much of this power as is
legitimate, belongs to the judiciary) and therefore there was no
necessity of an inhibition. The legislature cannot make a debt

